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INTRODUCTION 
On June 27, 1947, the Governor of the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts signed into law "An Act Providing for the 
Peaceful settlement of Industrial Disputes Dangerous to 
the Public Health and Safety," the so-called Slichter Act. 
The general intent of this law was also, near this time, 
incorporated in the statutes of other states and to a 
degree into federal law. 
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the 
Slichter Act to see if it has satisfactorily served the 
purpose for which it was designed and whether or not it 
is best adapted to present conditions. Although the 
primary objective of the law, that of protecting the 
public health and safety, has not been given a test, this 
paper concludes that the Slichter Act has not been a suc-
cessful law on the grounds that its secondary objectives 
have not been accomplished, that changing conditions have 
undermined the usefulness of the law, and that its existance 
has ~ d to some possible harmful implications. 
The argument in this paper will be presented in six 
chapters. The first~~ll be introductory in nature, filling 
in the historical background, citing various mechanisms for 
aiding the settlement of B bor disputes, and describing 
the popular sentiment which supported this type of legis-
lation. The second chapter will describe the establishment 
and construction of the Slichter Act specifically. In the 
third chapter. a study will be made of the six cases in 
which the Act has been invoked. and its usefulness will 
be pointed out. The fourth chapter will analyze the two 
principal objectives of the Act: affording protection to 
the public and aiding the settlement of disputes. The fifth 
chapter will consider the experience of other states with 
this type of legislation. and this experience will be re-
lated to the Slichter Act. The sixth chapter will summarize 
the findings of the paper and will state its conclusions. 
Summary 
THE HISTORICAL SETTING AND BACKGROUND OF 
THE SLIGHTER ACT 
1. 
This chapter will provide a brief description of the 
setting in which the Slichter Act arose, and it is hoped 
that these remarks will add perspective to the discussion 
and analysis in the subsequent chapters. The unpreceden-
ted strike activity after World War II and the resulting 
public reaction will be described. Availahlscorrective 
or preventative legislative mechanisms will be discussed 
very briefly, as well as previous experience in this coun-
try with legislation similar to the Slichter Act. The 
amount of resulting legislation will be summarized finally 
in order to show the extent to which public sentiment found 
its way into the law. Although it is not the primary purpose 
of this chapter to prove a particular point, there are two 
observations that may be made. One is that the period which 
gave rise to the Slichter Act and other such legislation in 
the United States was unique; never before or since has strike 
activity been so intense. The second observation that should 
be noted is that little previous experience in the United States 
was available in 1947 to guide the construction of public em-
ergency labor legislation, such as the Slichter Act. 
2. 
Historical Background. 
During the twelve-month period following v-J Day, the 
scope and magnitude of labor management disputes were the 
greatest in the histo:ey of the United States. There were 
4,630 work stoppages during this period involving five 
million workers and resulting in 120 million man days of 
idle time.l This period of severe labor unrest, of course, 
resulted from wartime restrictions, both moral and legal, 
being removed from labor activity. In addition, the gen-
eral labor market was in considerable turmoil resulting 
from the demobilization of ten million men and women in the 
armed services and a concurrent sharp curtailment of de-
fense production causing some shutdowns and a general re-
duction in overtime pay. Management also was in an uncer-
tain position because of its problems in retooling for 
civilian production and the unknown factors in the post-
war market. The dramatic consequences enacted in this 
setting are indicated in Table I. The same intense labor-
management situation occurred in man;r countries throughout 
the world and was by no means restricted to the United States. 
Table II reveals the extent of some of the trouble in other 
countries. After the immediate postwar period, strike ae-
tivity dropped off sharply, and in the United States did not 
1/ "Post-war Work Stoppages Caused by Labor-Management 
Disputes." Monthly tabor Review LXIII (Dee. 1946) PP• 
872-3. 
Table I 1 
Work Stoppages in the First Year After V-J Day, During 
World War II, and Yearly Average, 1935-1939. 
Period 
1st Post war yr. 
Aug. lf• 19!1.5 to 
Aug. 1 , 1946 
1942 
1943 
1944 
Yearly Average 
1935-1939 
i/ Ibid.; P• 883 
Work Stoppages 
No. Workers (000) 
4.630 4.981 
2-.968 840 
3.752 1,981 
4.956 2,116 
2,862 1,125 
Man Days Idle 
No. % of Est. {000) Work Time 
119,785 1.62 
4,183 .05 
13,501 .15 
8,721 .og 
16,949 .27 
even closely approach the 1946 level in these subsequent 
years. In other countries, the pattern was pretty much 
the same with one notable exception in new Zealand in 
1950-51. Data for the years following the postwar per-
iod are supplied in Table III. 
President Truman, still armed with many of his war-
time powers,. found himself suddenly with a very hot potato 
in his hands when the war ended. Only about a month after 
the close of hostilities, 43,000 refinery workers went out 
on strike eventually creating an acute gasoline shortage. 
On October 4, Truman ordered seizure of the industry. To 
augment his assortment of powers, he requested Congress on 
December 3 to authorize him to appoint fact-finding boards 
in labor disputes involving the public interest. Authority 
was a little slow in being granted, however, for Truman 
took the authority nine days later to appoint a board to 
investigate the G.Mto.A.W. strike involving 200,000 em-
ployees. Seventeen days later, he appointed another board 
to look into the steel dispute concerning 750,000 workers. 
Early in 1946, the government went into the meat pack-
business when a seizure order was issued on January 24 to 
bring 125,000 employees back to work. A few months later, 
after fact-finding and voluntary arbitration had failed to 
bring settlement, the government seized the railroads. 
This, however, did not prevent a two day tie-up of rail 
Table II 1 
Ra tea of Dazs Lost Throush Industrial Dis;eutes 12er 
Thousand Persons Em;elozed in Mines 2 Manufacturins, 
Construction and Trans;eort2 12~0 - 12~7. 
Count!:l !9.!!.Q ~ !2.!J:g 12lU !2hl! !2112 ~ llU 
Australia 1482 920 342 877 789 1787 1734 1167 
canada 188 294 280 603 289 897 2288 1246 
New Zealand 113 102 203 51 202 257 117 304 
Sweden 72 99 54 93 223 10981 26 47 
u. K. 85 100 168 167 377 301 181 202 
u. s. 360 1110 163 559 351 1755 5482 1459 
Table III 2 
Rates of Dazs Lost ;eer Thousand Persons EmElozed in Mini!!Sj, 
Manufac turi!!Sj1 Construction and Trans;eort1 12~1 - 12~· 
" Country ll!a"' !21& ~ lliQ. ill! 1.28 lli.l lli!t 
Australia 1050 1250 960 1440 6oo 810 740 680 
canada 1330 480 540 690 430 1140 620 660 
New Zealand 440 400 900 1070 4640 110 70 75 
Sweden 55 65 10 15 220 35 240 10 
u. K. 190 150 140 100 130 140 170 190 
u. s. 1450 1450 2290 1090 920 2400 1070 850 
1/ Woodbury, Robert Morse, •The Incidence of Industrial 
Dispute Rates of Time Loss, 1927-47," International Labor 
"" 
Review, LX(November, 1949) PP• 452·3· 
2/ "Industrial Disputes, 1937•54," International Labor Review, 
LXXII (July, 1955) P• 87. 
3/ f ; "\ 0 ,- 0 ~O (' \ q >of/ •' C\!, 'i: cJ ; c~ \ u.T e. I ct q f Q., 
6. 
transportation. Also concurrently, t~ government attempt-
ed to bring about 340,000 coal miners back to their jobs 
by a seizure order on May 21. Here, a substantial number 
of the miners did not return to work until an agreement was 
signed by John L. Lewis on May 29. The unprecedented amount 
of work stoppage plus this aggressive and well publicized 
role of the government stirred the public, and their legis-
lative representatives, to "do something about it." One 
might consider this as inevitable, as a public relieved of 
the tensions and sacrifices ot a war period would be in no 
mood to wait patiently for scarce goods while labor and 
management slug it out.l 
Public Reaction. 
The public view was echoed in the press phases such as 
this: " ••• must the Nation ever again be held for ransom by 
either belligerent in an industrial war? ••• Congress has 
ths power to replace such struggles with compulsory arbitra-
tion where the public welfare is jeopardized. It is time 
for the people to demonstrate that their determination and 
power to &et are also real."2' There was controversy, natur-
ally, about the role of government in such affairs, which we 
shall consider in detail later, but regardless of the merits 
1/ 11The Truce Settles Nothing," Christian Science Monitor, 
May 20, 1946, P• 16. 
2/ Cantril, Hadley and Strunk, Mildred, eds., Public 
O~nion, 1~~5-46, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
l 51) P• 8 • 
of the issues involved, it can safely be said that if a 
time existed for anti-strike li:l gislation, this was it. 
7. 
As Table IV shows, .the public definitely favored strike 
restrictions during war-time. Also, up to this time public 
sentiment in three different polls conducted by the American 
Institute of Public Opinion, favored strike regulation in 
public service industries. To the question: "Should laws 
be passed to forbid strikes in public service industries 
such as electric, gas, telephone, and local transportation 
companies?" from 58 to 64 per cent have answered in the aff-
irmative.l That legislators should at this time sponsor new 
labor legislation is not at all surprising. 
Available Strike Settlement Mechanisms. 
Despite such sentiments as expressed by Harold Enarson 
that neither formal government labor law~ "nor any other 
law, mechanism, procedure, or gadget can substitute for 
basic social responsibility,nl ~ gislators weighted with 
the mandate, seeming or real, to do something about the labor 
situation could not very well gratify their constituents with 
a formal recommendation for "social responsibility." For 
legislative purposes, then, one or more of a rather wide 
l/Enarson, Harold L., "The Politics of an Emergency Dispute," 
in Bernstein, Enarson, and Fleming, eds, Emergenc{ Disputes 
!!!,!!Bational Policy, New York: Harper and Bros., 955, P• 74• 
s. 
Table rvl 
Should Congress Pass a Law forbidding strikes in war 
industries until the war is over, or should the workers 
in war industries continue to have the right to go on strike? 
Date Forbid Pe:nnit No Opinion Polling 
Agency 
Immediately 
87% after Pearl H. 1% 5.8% Fortune 
Feb 23, 1 42 86 9 5 AIPO ?--
1 42 88 8 4 
,, 
May 30, NORC 
Jan 20, '43 81 13 6 AIPO 
Jun 16, '43 81 19 AIPO 
Jun 18, '43 86 10 4 NORC 
Nov 21, '43 69 23 8 AIPO 
Jan 4. '44 76 15 9 AIPO 
Jun 2, '44 10 15 15 AIPO 
Mar 1, '45 75 20 5 AIPO 
1/ Chamberlain, Neil w., Social Resbonsibi1ity and Strikes, 
New York: Harper & Bros., 1953, P• 6. -
J-j A.vHe•'C-a,., J.-Y\s-t ,-h.Y+e c:-~ yL, i.1\;c. C:::··\)\1.'\\(Hl...- , .. 
'/ N,.-i;w" 1 c ~\,, '"'' \:_e_·0 e"'""- Cett -\"'· 
assortment of "mechanisms" may have been selected. 
Broadly, this assortment would consist of the following: 
1/ Cooling-off Period. This by itself is a rather 
mild palliative. It introduces no positive efforts for 
settlement of the dispute, and aside from giving the public 
a brief respite from the effects of a strike, it offers 
little actual protection. In some situations, however, 
a cooling-of period may be useful in getting either labor 
or management off the hook when they have inadvert~ntly 
put themselves in a politically unretreatable position 
during pre-strike negotiations. A time delay, then, could 
enable ei.ther side to backwater gracefully and accomplish a 
settlement without the necessity of a strike. 
2/ Mediation and Conciliation. The effectiveness of 
these rests on the skill of the third party attempting to 
make peace between the disputants. Although there is a 
preponderant reliance on voluntary settlement, a con-
ciliator with considerable skill or prestige may strongly 
influence the parties into accomplishing a settlement. For 
industries where work stoppages would work severe hardships 
on the public, however, mediation and conciliation services 
offer little, if any, protection to the public. 
3/ Fact-Finding. Heavy reliance is made here on the 
pressure of public opinion and the prestige of the fact-
finding board. Because some degree of "moral obligation" 
10. 
is present, a certain amount of voluntarism in the final 
settlement may be lost. The voice of public opinion, 
however, is easily drowned out in the din of industrial 
conflict, and wQ.ere emotions are running high between labor 
and management the public will find its opinion to be an 
unreliable shield. More attention will be given to the im-
portance of public pressure in Chapter Four. 
4/ Injunction. Semantically tainted as far as labor 
is concerned, this is essentially the same as an enforced 
cooling-of period and is about as effective. The injunction 
procedures contained in the Taft-Hartley law ndled to bring 
about settlements in two out of three disputes where it was 
used during the first year of the law.l In these disputes 
it only served to delay the actual strike. 
5/ Seizure. If used by itself, it is very much like 
the injunction, with the difference that this action is 
generally quite repugnant to management. The thought of 
having a government official meddling with the affairs of 
the firm may in some instances be enough to precipitate a 
settlement. If temporary awards are made by the govern-
ment during seizure, this amounts to compulsory arbitration. 
Seizure machinery provides the public with a generally 
strong safeguard, but it contributes little toward voluntary 
settlement. 
1/Chamberlain, Neil w., 22• ~·• P. 274. 
ll. 
6/ Compulsory Arbitration. This offers very pos-
itive and decisive protection to the public, usually 
involving either injunction or seizure. Generally dis-
tasteful to both labor ~ management, compulsory arbi-
tration completely usurps voluntarism in final settlement. 
Considered in this field to be the most extreme form of 
government regulation, it has been the subject of many 
heated debates. Considerable attention shall be devoted 
to further aspects of compulsory arbitration in Chapter 
Four. 
7/ The Statutory or Nonstoppage Strike. This inter-
esting device is supposed to approximate a strike situation, 
yet permit continued production. If a strike is to be 
called in a designated industry, the government will step 
in and until settlement is reached will impose a penalty 
on both labor and management, perhaps fifty percent of the 
paycheck and fifty percent of net revenue. Such a penalty 
system would be designed to produce all the tactical effects 
of an actual strike, but the public would be assured of an 
uninterrupted flow of goods or services involved. At the 
same time complete voluntarism would be preserved for both 
labor and management. Aside from the formidable legal and 
political obstacles to such a scheme, this writer feels 
that it would completely sterilize the important ro~ of 
strike psychology on both sides if used, and would collapse 
12. 
in a disorganized jumble of malcontent and frustation. 1 
8/ Labor Courts. Most proponents of this approach 
recommend establishing a judicial system paralleling that 
of the federal courts, except that the organization would 
be considerably smaller in scale and would specialize in 
labor disputes invested with a public interest. Essen-
tially, this amounts to a highly formalized type of com-
pulsory arbitration;little voluntarism would be left to the 
disputants. 
9/ Special Legislation. Reliance on the legislature 
to enact special statutes to accomodate each emergency 
dispute as it arises has the advantage of prescribing the 
exact dose of medicine that may be required for each in-
dividual situation. Although this approach may preserve 
some voluntarism for labor and management, the slowness of 
legislative action plus the introduction of extraneous 
political considerations may offer rather unreliable pro• 
taction to the public. If a dispute occurs near election 
time, the legislator may decide to take his chances with a 
strike rather than to go out on a limb with special legis-
lation which might be loudly damned by either labor or 
management. 
1/ For further details see LeRoy Marceau and Richard 
Musgrave, "Strikes in Essential Industries: A Way Out," 
Harvard Business Review, XXVII (May 1949) P• 287 and George 
w. Goble, "The Non-Stoppage Strike, 11 Current Economic 
Comment, XII (August 1950) PP• 3-12. 
10/ Choice-of-Procedures. Legislation so tagged 
contains most of the approaches stated above in one way 
1.3. 
or another. A complete bag of tools is presented to the 
chief executive and the decision is left to him to fit the 
punishment to the crime. To what degree the public will be 
protected from emergency strikes and how much voluntary 
settlement is preserved in strikes are left to the judge-
ment of the executive. 
ll/ The Railway Labor Act. The particular combination 
of procedures in this act deserve some special comment 
even though, like the choice-of-procedures approach, the 
individual components have already been discussed. This 
act, passed in 1926 and amended in 1934 and 1951, estab-
lishes the National Railroad Adjustment Board to handle 
disputes involving the interpretation of existing contracts 
on the railroads. Disputes over terms of new contracts are 
handled by a three-man National Mediation Board. If this 
Board is unsuccessful in obtaining settlement, it asks the 
parties to submit to arbitration. If arbitration cannot 
be agreed to, a report is then made to the President of the 
United States who may then appoint an emergency investigating 
board. The Board is given thirty days to submit recommenda-
tions, and the status quo is frozen for another thirty days 
after this. At the end of this waiting period a strike 
may be called. Up to 1941, these procedures worked fairly 
14. 
well in preventing interruption of rail service; however, 
since then three major strikes have been prevented only 
by government seizure (in 1942-43, 1947, and 1951). Also, 
it is said that the existance of alternative procedures 
reduced the effectiveness of collective bargaining~l 
Although the outward techniques vary some in the eleven 
approaches described above, in general they boil down to 
three basic methods of settling disputes in industries 
where the public has a vital stake: 1/ Government acting 
in an advisory capacity and relying on the "good faith" of 
labor and management to bring about settlement: 2/ Temp-
orary government no-strike order with reliance on the time 
delay to permit a settlement to be reached: 3/ Positive 
government regulation with imposition of compulsory sett-
lement. The first of these has been used with reasonably 
good results in labor disputes generally. During the first 
year after the close of World War II, the u. s. Conciliation 
Service helped settle 12,500 disputes without a strike 
occurring, or about 91 per cent of those referred to it.2 
Two out of three of the work stoppages in which the Con-
ciliation Service served, however, were started before the 
Service was called upon by either labor or management • 
1/ Reynolds, Lloyd G., Labor Economics and Labor Relations, 
Second Edition; New York: Prentice Hall;-1954, p. 361. 
2/ Monthly Labor Review, 63 (December, 1946) p. 892. 
15. 
This would suggest that were the Conciliation Service 
called upon before the stoppage, fewer strikes would have 
occured. Despite the good record of this agency and 
others on different governmental levels, however, the public 
will not be much impressed by the settlement of nine out 
of ten disputes without a strike if the tenth dispute re-
sults in the strike which disrupts its supply of electri-
city. Legislation aimed at giving the public good protection 
then, will not rely on this approach. 
The attention of this paper will be directed to the 
second and third approaches, that is, temporary strike 
prohibition and compulsory settlement. The Slichter Act 
of Massachusetts will be used for specific analysis. In 
practice, these two approaches tend to blend into a single 
area. Although seizure may be considered only to be of a 
temporary restraining nature, for example, the manner in 
which it is administered can put it into the third category. 
of compulsory settlement. As John A. Stephens, Vice Pres-
!dent of the U.S. Steel Company, put it after the post-
war steel dispute: "Seizure in this steel dispute has had 
the effect of converting the voluntary, non-binding pro-
cedures of the Wage Stabilization Board into a rigid system 
of compulsory arbitration."l In further discussion, unless 
1/ Kleiler, Frank M., "Presidential Seizures in Labor 
Disputes," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 6 
(July 1953) p. 553, as-quoted from Testimony, April 22, 1952, 
before Senate Committee on Labor and Welfare. 
a distinction is specifically called for, these two 
approaches will be treated as one. 
Previous Experience. 
16. 
The sentiment favoring restrictions on labor disputes 
in critical industries which arose after World War II 
was not exactly new. President Wilson was faced with a 
similar problem after World War I snd appointed a special 
commission to study the problem. The commission reported 
in reference to suspension of utility service caused by a 
labor dispute; "Suspension produces practical social and 
economic anarchy and may impose hardship even to the point 
of starvation upon large sections of the community. The 
interruption in such essential public utilities is intol-
erable."1 Perhaps one of the most celebrated declarations 
of the supremacy of the public right was expressed 9Y Calvin 
Coolidge who stated during the Boston Police Strike of 1919 
that "there is no right to strike against the public safety 
by anybody, at any time, anywhere."2 Another notable op-
inion in this area was stated by Justice Holmes: "I have 
no doubt that when the power either of capital or labor is 
1/ As quoted by Buel w. Patch, Compulso~ Arbitration~ 
Editorial Research Reports, II (August 47) P• 592. 
2/ Ibid., P• 590. 
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asserted in such a way as to attack the life of the community, 
those who seek their private interest at such cost are 
public enemies and should be dealt with as such."l 
Although there seems to be a rather rich history of 
pronouncements on this subject, little of this has resulted 
in legislation. Seizure has been primarily a wartime tech-
nique. There were three during World War I, and fifty-
nine during World War II, including those occurring immed-
iately before and after the actual period of conflict. Most 
of the World War II seizures were a result of either company 
or union not complying with War Labor Board decisions. This 
experience, though perhaps informative to a certain extent, 
was gained in a period when the behavior of labor, manage-
ment, the government and the public could not reasonably 
be expected to remain the same during what we like to con-
sider normal peacetime. 
Previous to this time the only significant experience 
with compulsory arbitration was wlth the Industrial Court 
Act of Kansas enacted in 1920. Arising out of the severe 
fuel shortages caused by the great coal strike of 1919, 
this Act set up a neutral arbitration board empowered to 
enforce strike and lockout prohibitions and to adjudicate 
1/ As quoted bt John C Knox, "We Can and Must Have Ind-
ustrial Peace, The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 
165 (January 30,~47) p. 622. ---
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disputes in industries designated to be in the public 
interest. The decisions reached by the court did not re-
ceive much adverse criticism, and many cases were settled 
satisfactorily, probably preventing some strikes.l It 
became difficult in some cases to enforce the act, however, 
and in a few national disputes it was impossible. Finally, 
the act as it applied to food industries was declared un-
constitutional in 1923, 2 and two years later the Supreme 
Court declared the entire act unconstitutional for all 
industries not vitally involved with the public interest.3 
The decision by Justice Van Devanter, in part,reads as 
follows: 
The system of compulsory arbitration which the 
act establishes is intended to compel, and if sus-
tained, will compel, the owner and the employees to 
continue the business-on terms ilircnare not of their 
making. 
It will constrain them not merely to respect the 
terms, if they continue in business, but will 
constrain them to continue the business-on-those 
-- - -terms. 
True, the terms have some qualifications, but 
as shown in the prior decision (1923), the qualifi-
cations are rather illusory and do not subtract much 
from the duty imposed. 
Such a system infringes the liberty of contract 
1/ Millis, Harry H. and Montgomery, Royal E., The Economics 
of Labor, Volume III: Or~anized Labor, New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Co., Inc., 194 , PP• 822-829. 
2/ Charles Wolf Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 
262 u. s. 522 (1923). -
3/ Wolf Packing Co v. Court of Industrial Relations 267 
u. s. 552 (1925). -
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and rights of property guaranteed by the due-process 
clause of the 14th Amendment.! 
Since the time of these decisions, however, the 
position of the Supreme Court has changed somewhat, as 
noted by Henry J. Allen, Governor of Kansas 1919 to 1923.2 
In 1937 the Court reversed a previous decision and upheld 
the constitutionality of a state minimum wage law which 
had previously been rejected as a violation of freedom of 
contract. It likewise upheld the Federal Wages and Hours 
Act of 1938 in a decision rendered in 1941. Also, as many 
writers neglect to note while pointing an accusing finger 
at the Kansas Act, it actually has never been tested as 
it applies to public utilities. 
Resulting Legislation. 
"Government intervention may be clumsy, inept, and 
wrong-headed, but such intervention cannot be banished 
without solving the situation which brings it about."3 
Perhaps sensing this imperative for government action, the 
federal legislature as well as those of many of thestates 
bore out the Galbraith thesis of countervailing powers and 
produced a variety of legislative programs. 
1/ As quoted by Edward Keatman "Compulsory Arbitration 
of Labor Dispute--Nol," The Rotarian, .LVII (March 1947) 
P• 6oo. ---
2/ Patch, Buel w., 22• cit. p. 6oo. 
3/ Enarson, Harold L., QP; 2!i•• PP• 74-75• 
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There were many federal bills proposed which involved 
compulsory arbitration. Bills advocated by Senator 
Ferguson of Michigan and Representative Miller of Nebraska 
proposed compulsory arbitration in public utilities. A 
bill offered by Representative Smith of Maine recommended 
seizure and compulsory arbitration. Omnibus bills such as 
the Ball-Taft-Smith and the revised Case bill relied 
heavily on compulsory arbitration. Five identical bills 
were presented in the House by Auchincloss of New Jersey, 
Case of New Jersey, Hale of Main, Heselton of Massachusetts, 
and Herter of Massachusetts which would authorize the Pres-
ident to proclaim an emergency, issue a strike prohibition, 
and require compulsory arbitration.l The upshot of these 
proposals was, of course, the Taft-Hartley law which pro-
vided, in disputes involving the national health or welfare, 
for a fact-finding board, an 80-day injunction, a board of 
inquiry, and finally recommendation for special leg1slation.2 
Compared to much of the recommended legislation, the statute 
as enacted was pretty mild stuff. 
In the forty-four states where the legislatures met in 
regular or special session in 1947, thirty-five considered 
l/ Shishkin, Boris "The Case Against Compulsory Arbitration," 
The ~erican Federationist, 54 (February 1947) p. 18. This 
writer was amused by Mr. Sbishkin's reference to the last of 
these various bills as the "ACHHH" Bill. 
2/ Rohman, Murray M., "National Emergency Disputes," Labor 
~Journal, 8 (August 1957) PP• 526-527. 
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various bills relating to industrial relations. Sixty 
bills were passed regulating or restricting union activity 
in thirty states. Ten of these involved specific reg-
ulation of strikes in public utilities.l Among the leg-
islation in these ten states was the Slichter Act of 
Massachusetts. 
Use of Terms. 
Before proceeding further, the area of legislation 
under discussion should be clarified on two points. In 
the literature regarding government intervention, especially 
compulsory arbitration, there seems to be a tendency for 
writers to confuse or, if they are trying to state a case, 
to miss the issue. Compulsory arbitration as a solution 
to disputes which threaten the health and safety of the 
public iS' one thing. Disputes, even though widely pub-
licized, which are not intimately connected with the public 
are quite another. Most arguments which may be offered for 
strict strike regulation are simply not relevant to non-
public interest strikes; yet in man:y discussions, there is 
the assumption that the issueS involve !!!. strikes. Proper 
qualification of terms is critical here. 
1/ "Labor Legislation in the United States," International 
Labor Review, LVI (November-December 1947} P• 596. 
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The second point is that disputes referred to in this 
paper are those concerning contract negotiations. A dispute 
arising from ·an existing contract is a matter of interpre-
tation or application. Settling a dispute over a new contract 
is a matter of determining what the agreement will be be-
tween the parties,l which is quite a different dish of tea. 
Disputes arising from contract interpretation involve the 
rights of the employee under that contract, the terms and 
extent of which have already been agreed to by both labor 
and management. Since the area of such a dispute is dis-
tinctly limited, the dispute is not likely to achieve any 
great importance. Actually, there is usually not much of a 
problem with existing contracts. A BLS survey of 1,254 
representative labor-management agreements covering about 
five million workers showed that at least three-quarters 
of them had arbitration provisions. This type of clause is 
especially frequent in public utility contracts.2 In most 
cases, the.. disputes arising from contract interpretation 
would automatically be referred by voluntary agreement to 
arb! tra tion. 
The primary concern of this paper, howeyer, is with 
the settlement of disputes arising out of negotiations for 
a new contract. Here, the interests of the employee are at 
1/ Sanders, Paul H., "Types of Labor Disputes and Approaches 
to Their Settlement," Law and Contemporary Problems, Duke 
University, 12 (Spririg~~p. 217. 
2/ Shiskin, Boris, "The Settlement of Contract Negotiation 
Disputes: A Labor Viewpoint," 1£!g., P• 361. 
stake; the dispute is· about what the employee would like 
to get rather than what he should get. Provisions of a 
new contract are not necessarily limited by previous 
agreement and can take any direction. Basic questions 
such as wage rates and general conditions of employment 
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may be in question, and agreement between labor and manage-
ment may not be forthcoming easily. Since the magnitude of 
a dispute here is apt to be quite different, settlement 
procedures must also be of a different order. 
Conclusion. 
In this chapter, the state of labor-management rela-
tions has been ezamined during the post World War II period, 
and it was found to be in a very bad way, historically the 
worst in terms of the amount of strike activity. Consid-
erable public reaction ensued, resulting in the creation of 
various ~gislative programs, the Slichter Act being one. 
In the next chapter, the provisions of this Act will be 
detailed. In Chapter Five, for purposes of comparison, 
provisions of the other state laws of similar character 
will be discussed. 
Summary 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE ESTABLISHMENT AND PROVISIONS 
OF TEE SLIGHTER ACT 
Changing the focus of attention from the general to 
the particular, this chapter will consider the details of 
the Slichter Act~ The actual legislation that was passed 
followed closely the original ideas of Sumner Slichter and 
provides several choices of procedures in handling labor 
disputes involving industries affected with a public in-
terest. The 1954 Amendment to the Slichter Act further 
extends these choices. Although a wide range of power is 
vested in the Governor to handle labor disputes which 
threaten the public health and safety, the Act lays heavy 
stress in the initial procedures in attempting to encourage 
voluntary settlement between labor and management. Its 
final procedures, however, authorize the Governor to seize 
an industry threatened with an interruption of service and 
to impose compulsory changes in the conditions of work. 
Origin of the Act 
The Slichter Act was patterned largely after the report 
of a special committee appointed by Governor Bradford in 
late 1946. This committee consisted of nine members, 
equally divided in representation among labor, employers, 
and the public,l with Sumner H. Slichter of Harvard as 
Chairman. The appointment of this committee was announced 
by Governor Bradford in his inaugural address delivered 
before the General Court on January 2, 1947. In this ad-
dress he stated that to a large measure the future of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts depended upon maintaining a 
healthy industrial climate and that the Commonwealth cannot 
prosper with any prouacted periods of work stoppages which 
might involve millions of workers and seriously interrupt 
production. Bradford stated: "!believe that further ex-
ploration along the road of industrial understanding is 
highly desirable before seeking to legislate further penal-
ties or further privileges. To this end I have asked nine 
~aders in the field to study the possibilities and to re-
commend to me ••• such changes in our existing laws as they 
believe to be most helpful to narrow the area and limit the 
damaging effects of industrial disputes:2 In addition to 
considering the problem of protecting the public health and 
safety by controlling strikes in public interest industries, 
the committee also considered and made recommendations on 
other aspects of industrial relationa. These, however, are 
1/ Representing labor: Harold D. Ulrich, Anthony J. De 
Andrade, and Jack Horvich; employers: Clarence G. McDavitt, 
Seabury Stanton, and James E. Wall; and the public: Douglass 
v. Brown, Thomas E. Shortell, and Sumner H. Slichter, Chair-
man of the committee. 
2/ Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Senate Document No. 1, 1947, 
Inaugural Address of Governor Robert F. Bradford, January 2, 
1947, PP• 34-35. 
not relevant to the subject of this paper and will not 
be discussed. 
Views of Slichter. 
From the evidence at hand, there is little doubt that 
the views of Slichter strongly influenced, if not dominated, 
the final report of the committee. In an article published 
by Slichter in 1946 he states: 
The government's policy should be based upon a 
declaration of rights of the community---a public 
bill or rights. 
This declaration should assert the right of the 
commrinity to an adequate supply of essential services and 
commodities. It should place upon the president (or in 
the case of state legislation, the Governor) the duty 
to declare that a public emergency exists when a threa-
tened or actual interruption to production so seriously 
limits or threatens to limit the output of essential 
goods and services as to imperil the public health, 
the public safety, or the general welfare.l 
Slichter goes on to outline in this article a plan where 
such strikes could be specifically outlawed by executive 
declaration and the parties involved would have three options 
in choosing a settlement procedure: 1/continue by themselves, 
2/ choose arbitrators, or 3/ allow the government to select 
arbitrators. In asking himself whether or not this plan 
would work and whether the union and individual members 
would obey the non-strike order, he says: "No one knows the 
answers. There is no way of assuring that thousands of men 
will stay at their jobs or return to their jobs simply be-
cause their refusal to do so would be either a national or 
1/Slichter, Sumner H., "Public Bill of Rights Urged to Cut 
Strikes," Christian Science Monitor, May 20, 1946, P• 1. 
local disaster." 
However, Slichter points out these advantages of this 
plan: 1/ Being based on a protection of the rights of the 
public, no one will dispute its basic intent. Th~ will 
give it a "moral command" difficult for anyone to refute. 
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2/ RegulatioruL of the right to strike are made as narrow as 
possible: to those situations where the public interests 
are seriously threatened. 3/ The plan is flexible and 
allows use of judgement in applying the law. If government 
officials feel that the public does not support the use of 
the act, through indifference, they are not required to 
invoke it. 4/ Since this plan works through unions, it adds 
prestige to their position of recognizing community interests. 
It would not be wise, he continues, to prohibit outright all 
strikes in utilities, transportation, etc., for there are 
a substantial number of disputes in these industries which 
would not result in any serious threat to the public welfare. 
Prohibitions of this sort would be difficult to enforce be-
cause of public indifference, and eventually this could 
bring the policy into general disrepute. "• •• .-. policy which 
becomes operative only when a serious emergency is threat-
ened or exists is best designed to command strong moral 
support from the public. Without such support the policy 
will fa11. 11 
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The Act. 
The basic ideas of Slichter were then added to those 
of the Governor• s Committee and finally sifted. through by 
the Massachusetts legislature. The law as actually passed 
clearly expressed the Slichter approach, and its popular 
name, the Slichter Act, was appropriately adopted. The 
procedures provided by the act of 1947 (and the 1954 amend-
ments) are briefly as follows:l 
1/ Where the Commissioner of Labor and Industries 
finds that an industrial dispute imminently threatens an 
interruption of the production or distribution of goods or 
services essential to the public health and safety, he shall 
certify this dispute to the Governor. Essential goods or 
services means food, fuel, water, electric light arpower, 
gas and hospital or medical services. Production and dis-
tribution include any necessary process or operation 
ancillary to those operations. 
2/ If in the opinion of the Governor there is an 
imminent threat to the public he may select one (or more) 
of the following courses of action: 
a/ Appoint a Moderator who is directed to deter-
mine during meetings with the parties to the dispute why the 
matter should not be referred to arbitration. If, at the 
end of a specified period, one or both of the parties is 
unwilling to submit to arbitration and no voluntary 
1/ For complete text of the Slichter Act, see Appendix. " 
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settlement has been reached otherwise, the Moderator shall 
report to the Governor which (or both) of the parties is 
responsible for the failure. 
b/ The Governor may declare an emergency and 
either arrange informally for continued production or 
direct seizure of the plant. During the period of seizure, 
the Governor may change the conditions of work as recom-
mended by a board of arbitration as appointed under a/ above, 
or if none has been appointed, he may establish a special 
commission and effect their recommendations. 
3/ When in the opinion of the Governor there ceases 
to exist a threat to the public, he may terminate invocation 
of the act even though a final settlement may not have been 
reached. 
As the Governor's Committee recommended, and apparently 
as the legislature agreed, a wide choice of powers was 
granted to the Governor to handle emergency disputes. When-
ever any of the provisions of the act are invoked, further 
strike action is thereby prohibited. Appointment of a 
Moderator is sufficient to stop or thwart a strike, seizure 
adds further pressure to bring about settlement, and finally 
the power to alter conditions of employment during seizure 
amounts to the same thing as compulsory arbitration. The 
Governor's Commit.tee, although recommending this range of 
power, nevertheless cautioned their unbridled use: "The 
Committee does not believe that the seizure of plants is 
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a desirable way o~ dealing with disputes between labor and 
management, and calls attention to the ~act that seizure 
does not settle dif~erences over the terms o~ employment.l 
Amendments. 
In June o~ 1954 one amendment to the Slichter Act 
was passed which broadened the choice o~ procedures of 
the Governor and which added a preliminary investigation 
to determine the extent of the threat of a dispute to the 
public health and sa~ety. Generally, the provisions of 
this amendment were: 1/ The Moderator, besides acting to 
get the disputing parties to submit to arbitration, may 
also act as a conciliator and consider the merits of the 
issues involved; 2/ The Governor may request the ~rties 
directly to submit the dispute to arbitration; 3/ Instead 
o~ the Governor selecting all members of the emergency 
arbitration board, the option is given to labor and manage-
ment to select one each of the arbitrators; and 4/ Before 
the decision is made to invoke the law, the Governor 
should, i~ practicable, hold i~ormal hearings with the 
parties to the dispute, the Commissioner of Labor and 
Industries, and the Commissioner of Public Savety to determine 
whether or not in any dispute there is an actual and im-
minent threat to the public health and safety. 
1/ Commonwealth of 
Labor - Managemen 
No. 1875, P• 25. 
Massachusetts Re 
Com ttee, March 
o~ the Governor's 
7, House Document 
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Also passed by the legislature during the spring of 
1954 was a rather specialized amendment to the Slichter 
Act. This extended coverage to the service provided by 
the New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nan-
tucket Steamship Authority. "If transportation of 
passengers on the Steamship line of the Authority is 
interrupted by reason of any group of employees calling 
a strike ••• the provisions of Chapter 150B of the General 
Laws (the Slichter Act) shall apply in so far as they are 
applicable.nl 
Conclusion 
Following the national postwar wave of industrial unrest 
that established new statistical records, and upon the 
request of a new Governor seeking to promote a healthy 
industrial climate, the Slichter Act was passed by the 
Massachusetts legislature. This legislation was not man-
ifestly experimental, but those who studied the problem 
seriously exhibited some apprehension. Prof. Slichter had 
stated that it could not be predicted how well this approach 
would work, and the special committee in its report cautioned 
against its unbridled use, especially the aspect of gov-
ernment seizure of industry. It was pointed out in Chapter 
One that there has been little peacetime experience with 
this type of legislation, the ill fated Kansas Act being the 
1/ Acts and Resolves, 1954, Chapter 449. 
only precedent. In the twelve years since 1947, how-
ever, some useful experience has been gained with the 
Slichter Act and comparable mgislation in other states. 
The next chapter will describe the actual application 
of the Slichter Act, and important developments with 
such laws of other states will be considered in Chapter 
Five. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SIX DISPUTES IN WHICH THE SLIGHTER ACT WAS 
USED 
Summary 
To date, the Slichter Act has been used six times, 
twice in 1948 and four times in 1953. It is the purpose 
of this chapter to examine the details of the disputes 
involved in these six cases and to determine whether or 
not use of the Act was necessary. From the evidence at 
hand, it is the conclusion of this writer that use of 
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the Act was not necessary, according to the stated purpose 
of the Act, "to protect the public health and safety." 
An account of each case will show that either an actual 
strike was not imminent or that the occurence of a strike 
would not automatically have produced an emergency. In 
onel of the six cases, the union announced that it had 
no strike plans, in two others2 the threatened or actual 
interruption of the supply of goods and services could not 
reasonably be considered a threat to the public health and 
safety, and in the three remaining cases3 there is suffi-
1/ Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates. 
2/ Trucker's Association, Milk Companies. 
3/ New England Electric System, Worcester Gas-Light Company, 
Montaup Electric Company. 
~. 
cient evidence to indicate that supply could have been 
maintained with alternative labor forces, 
<t 
It should be noted that during the course of some1the 
disputes that will be described either union or management, 
or both, has refused to arbitrate. In some cases, such 
as the Trucker's Association dispute, the press has made 
a big point of this and has implied that this refusal to 
arbitrate is equivalent to being non-cooperative and per-
haps stubborn as well. Actually, the arbitration of 
contracts is not the usual thing in labor negotiations, 
and there is really no reason traditionally wny either 
union or management should submit to arbitration. An 
announced willingness to arbitrate, such as by management 
in the Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates case, could be 
little more than a grand gesture, designed to improve its 
position in the eyes of the public, In the following cases, 
then, "refusal to arbitrate" should be considered in this 
perspective. 
Truckers Association - First Case 
A little more than six months after its enactment, the 
Slichter Act was to get its first tryout. As will be poin~~ 
ed out, this was an unfortunate baptism, for there was not 
a clear cut threat to the public health and safety, and the 
issues were blurred by extraneous influences. Also, since 
settlement was reached outside of the procedures of the 
Slichter Act, some support can be given to the argument 
that in this case the Slichter Act, if anything, only 
hindered negotiations. 
Negotiations between Teamsters Local 25 (A.F.L.) and 
the Truckers Association broke down, with neither side 
apparently showing any desire to compromise on a settlement. 
Declaring that a strike of the truckers would cut off 
supplies of goods essential to the public health and safety, 
Governor Bradford on January 1, 1948, invoked the Slichter 
Act and appointed Douglass v. Brown as Moderator to the 
dispute. Arrangements were made through the Division of the 
Necessaries of Life of the Department of Labor and Indus-
tries to provide for the emergency movement of food. To 
facilitate amergency deliveries, the Division of Public 
Safety placed a teletype machine in the Division office 
and the union headquarters and furnished State Police Of-
ficers to operate the machine. Any complaints received 
could thus be transmitted directly to the wiion for clear-
ance. About 150 emergency deliveries were handled this 
way during the period of the strike.l 
Thus, the Slichter Act was not used to stop the strike 
completely, and apparently this system of partial operations 
was not sufficient to stem public indignation. Also, 
company charges of picket violence and arbitrary action 
1/ Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Annual Report farthe 
period July 1, 1947 to June 30, 1948, Department of Labor 
and Industries, Division on the Necessities of Life. 
and union charges of "sneak" deliveries did not help 
public relations any. The Boston Herald stated editor-
ially: "The public does have a right to demand that the 
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two sides learn to settle their disputes without inflicting 
them on everybody. If all else fails there is arbitration, 
and it is ridiculous to say that arbitration over $10 a 
week is impossible when arbitration --- through judicial 
process is constantly exercised in far graver issues."l 
The Monitor stated that the union no-arbitration policy 
"originates largely from an extremist group. During the 
war this faction thought so little of the public welfare 
that it put on a big wildcat strike, tying up local freight 
handling merely because of an internal squabble over the 
officers of the organization."2 
A week passed after the invocation of the Slichter 
Act and the Moderator made no headway in getting an agree-
ment to arbitrate. Meanwhile, further instances of un-
ruly union behavior were reported. Governor Bradford then 
had this to say: 
The situation is getting completely out of hand. 
I do not propose, Mr. Cahouet (of the Trucking 
Companies), to let the Commonwealth be used to 
pull your chestnuts out of the fire. Nor do I 
propose, Mr. Hurst (President, Local 25), to 
allow the public to suffer the consequences of 
1/ The Boston Herald. "Truck Strike Action," June 5, 1948. 
2/ The Christian Science Monitor, January 6, 1948, p. 16. 
further excesses by. some of your pickets ••••• 
If this State has reached the point where it is 
at the mercy of a heedless group of employers 
and a willful group of Union members, it is 
about time we found it out. After consideration 
of the Moderator's report, if you have not ar-
rived at an understanding I shall take every step 
within my power, not to break this strike; but 
to stop it. 
I do not intend that the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts be subjected to further economic 
strangulation.l 
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After this, very little trouble was reported. None-
theless the strike continued, and the Moderator was still 
unable to achieve an agreement to arbitrate. The Union, 
however, in agreements with many small trucking companies 
was able to sign temporary new contracts. It was reported 
that the strategy of the Union was to break up the unity 
of the employer group in this way, and by January 16, the 
Union claimed to have signed contracts with 162 companies. 
These companies, however, did not account for a very large 
percentage of the total trucking capacity.2 At the same 
time the opinion at the State House seemed to be divided 
on whether or not seizure could be effected for tre entire 
industry or for just that part involving "essential" ship-
ments. The fact of the matter was, however, that those 
1/ Statement of Governor Bradford to Representatives of 
Union and Employers Group, "January 8, 1948, as reprinted 
in Addresses and Messages to the General Court, Public 
Addresses, Official Statements and Correspondence of 
General Interest of His Excellency Governor Robert F. 
Bradford, 1947 and 1948. 2/ Carr, Frederick w., The Christian Science Monitor, 
January 16, 1948, P• 2 .• 
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trucks carrying "essential" supplies were ~ strikebound.l 
The issue was settled on January 20 when Governor Bradford 
stated that seizure would not be accomplished, for there 
was not "enough of an emergency."2 The Union had threat-
ened to take the Slichter Act to court if seizure orders 
were issued, while at the same time the attorney for the 
companies suggested to the Legislatu1~ that further leg-
islation should be passed to make impossible a re-occur-
ence of this situation.3 
The Moderator was successful only in getting the 
Union to place the issue of arbitration before the Union 
membership for a vote. At a meeting of about 2,000 members 
of Local 25, the proposal to arbitrate was rejected by 
"a thunderous voice vote. 114 This meeting was addressed 
by one of the members of the original Governor's Committee, 
the Rev. Thomas e Shortell. He told the audience that 
"The law was never intended for such a situation as yours •••• 
I don't think your type of strike is the type they put the 
Slichter law through for. I 1 ll even tell Governor Bradford 
that I don•t think your strike has endangered the public 
safety." He added: "You have a just cause for a strike 
1/ The Christian Science Monitor, January 19, 1948. 
2/ Ibid., January 20, 1948. 
)/ BOSton Globe, January 19, 19h8. 
4/ Boston ~· January 19, 194$. 
and I hope you win it," and forthwith gave the strike 
his "priestly blessing."l 
The Moderator, who was also a member of the original 
Governor's Committee, then submitted his report to the 
Governor stating that attempts to reach an agreeme.nt to 
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arbitrate the dispute had failed. From this point on, 
provisions of the Slichter law were not used, even though 
the Union kept up shipments of "essential" goods on a 
voluntary basis. The dispute was then turned over to the 
State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration. The Chairman 
of this organization therewith stated: "While we have had 
both sides before us several times before, we had to 
conciliate in a detached sort of way because of the hear-
ings of the Moderator named by the Governor to seek 
arbitration. We couldn't get down to real work •••• " In 
the same account, the editor of International Teamster, 
Lester M. Hunt, was quoted as saying: "We feel sure that if 
the State had kept out of this strike we might have had it 
settled by this time." The result of using the Slichter 
Law, he stated, was to keep 11 the parties to the dispute 
apart for nearly three weeks. It impeded negotiations. 11 2 
Four days after the dispute was turned over to the 
State Board, hopeful signs of settlement were reported.) 
1/ Ibid. 
2/ ~Christian Science Monitor, January 20, 1948. 
3/ Ibid., January 24, 1948. 
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The companies bad made an offer, which although rejected 
by the union was countered by a modification of the union 
demands. In another ten days the Union announced that 
a different offer of the companies bad been accepted. 
This offer put the wages of Local 25 higher than those of 
the surrounding areas and, naturally, was considered to 
be a substantial victory for the Union. The economics of 
the strike were such, however, that if the strike were to 
continue for a much longer period of time, it would have 
been impossible tor the union members to make up the wages 
that they were losing bybeing out on strike. Also, the 
international union was expected to withdraw its support, 
together with strike benefits, if the strike continued.l 
Thus ended the first strike in which the Slichter Act 
was used. Was it successful? Movement of "essential" 
goods was maintained with few difficulties. The General 
Counsel tor the Department of Labor and Industries, Raymond 
F. O'Connell, stated in an interview2 with this writer, 
however, that the Union expressed willingness to make 
essential deliveries before strike action was taken. Also, 
wheh the Moderator submitted his report, and for all 
purposes the invocation of the act was removed, the union 
1/ Carr, Frederick w., Ibid., February 5, 1948, p.l. 
2/ July 1, 1951. -
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continued to make essential deliveries on a voluntary 
basis. Perhaps the union spokesman was a little excessive 
in writing: "And under the rigid state application of the 
Slichter law, the union had to move cherries for Manhattan 
cocktails and olives for Martinis. They were necessities 
of life under the law Prof. Slichter of Harvard conceived 
in the cloistered halls of classical learning."l 
This writer concludes that it would be very difficult 
indeed to justify the use of the Slichter Act in this 
strike on the basis that it was necessary to maintain the 
flow of essential goods. Counsellor O'Connell also stated 
that the State Attorney General "was gunning for the 
Teamsters" and was urging the Governor to take action, 
indicating that there was perhaps something more involved 
yhan the public health. Also, as O'Connell pointed out, 
the state could just as well have used State trucks to 
move the essentials and otherwise take no direct action 
in the strike. For its first trial, this seems to have 
been an unfortunate choice for the Slichter Act. 
Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates - Second Case. 
The second invocation of the Act followed close on 
the heels of the first. Before the trucking strike was 
settled, negotiations collapsed between the Eastern Gas and 
1/ Hunt, Lester M., "Boston Strikers Win Hard Fight," 
The International Teamster, XLV (March 1948) P• 3. 
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Fuel Associates (gas manuracturers serving Boston) and 
the Gas, Coke, and Chemical Workers (c.I.O.). Had this 
dispute resulted in a strike, there is little doubt that 
serious threat would have been made to the public health 
and sarety. However, thB evidence shows that an actual 
strike was not imminent and that use or the Slichter Act 
was either premature or unnecessary altogether. 
The Union demanded an increase or 15~. per hour plus 
a three-week vacation arter 15 years or service, and re-
jected the possibility or arbitration. The company orrered 
1~, would not agree to change the current plan or three-
week vacation arter twenty years of service, and announced 
that it would be willing to arbitrate the dispute. This 
gas strike, if efrected,was described by the Chairman of 
the State Board of Arbitration and Conciliation as a 
"calamity, worse than any other that ever took place in 
the history of Hew England." In addition to cutting orr 
the supply ror domestic cooking and heating, hospitals 
would be without means to prepare meals and to sterilize 
instruments. 
If this strike once started, it would be three months 
before service could be rully restored because of the 
sarety checks necessary in closing and opening the mains. 
If service were stopped, li million people in 34 communities 
and 64 hospitals would be without gas service in the dead of 
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winter. In addition to the interrupted service, the company 
stated that the greater number or its 204 coke ovens 
would be ruined ir allowed to go out and would have to be 
"rerracted" before operations could be started again. 
After a settlement would be reached, the company main-
tained, many or the workers would be out or jobs until 
these ovens could be repaired. In addition, or course, the 
union would certainly receive a large measure of unqualified 
damnation rrom 1} million irate consumers. 
On January 30, the rinal day of the existing contract, 
the dispute had been narrowed down to a dirrerence between 
union and management of 21 on the wage boost and three 
years on the amount or service necessary to qualify for a 
three-weeks' vacation. Stated Governor Bradrord that 
morning: "At present I'm just standing by." He indicated 
that immediate seizure would be made if a settlement were 
not reached, stating that danger to the public was so 
imminent and so great. Michael Farraher, president of 
Local 283 of the Union, however, stated in the same news-
paper account: "As rar as I know, the men will continue 
working. No stri)ce vote has been taken."l Also, it 
should be noted, no strike vote was taken; a strike could 
not be sanctioned by the international union and would be 
1/ Boston Globe, January 30, 1948. 
passed off as "wildcat".l Another account on this final 
day of the old contract reported that the union leaders 
disclaimed strike intentions. "They discounted strike 
~. 
talk and added that the union members would work if the state 
took over the plant. They declared that the newspaper 
publicity given the possibility of state seizure has in-
cited rather than discouraged strike sentiment by misrep-
# 
resenting union opinion and promoting the thought of strike.2 
At 3:45 P.M. on the January 30, however, Governor 
Bradford signed orders, and a temporary restraining order 
was obtained from the Suffolk Superior Court to halt any 
striking. Benjamin Selekman was appointed as Moderator. 
Brig. Gen. Ralph Boyd was appointed Administrator of the 
plant. After announcement of the seizure, there seemed to 
be no particular reaction. Employees reported for work as 
usual, the plant operated normally, and there was no hint 
of trouble.3 The only grumble noted by the press was that 
of management, who appeared to be enjoying a type of refuge 
in the Slichter Act. A number of times the strategy of the 
union, management is reported to have said, has been to 
hold a gun against the company in the form of a strike and 
in making demands to which the company had to y~eld in 
1/ Boston Post, January 30, 1948. 
2/ Carr, P?ederick W., The Christian Science Monitor, 
January 30, 1948, . . 
3/ Smith, Everett M., The Christian Science Monitor, 
January 31, 1948, p. l. 
order to avert a public calamity.l 
Although the Moderator did not have much luck in bring-
ing out an arbitration agreement, General Boyd became 
instrumental in bringing about a settlement with collective 
bargaining. On February 17, final settlement was made with 
the union getting for the workers a 13t wage hike and a 
three-week vacation after 15 years. Governor Bradford 
termed the settlement "a triumph of collective bargaining," 
and General Boyd stated that the Sllchter Act 11 1n this case 
has been very helpful to the public 1nterest. 112 
There seems to be little question that had this 
strike come about, there would be a ~ ~ public 
emergency. Even though the company had informed the 
Governor that in the event of a strike, supervisory workers 
could maintain the plant at about 50 per cent capacity, any 
resulting drop in gas pressure would bring about a very 
Qazardous situation.3 Also, John A. Callahan, Comm-
issioner, Department of Labor and Industries stated in an 
interview with this writer4 that the nature of a gas man-
ufacturing plant is such that supervisory help could not 
keep things going very long. To this writer, the question 
here is not so much whether or not a strike would be cala-
1/ The Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 1948, P• 4• 
2/ Boston Globe, February 17, 1948. 
)/ Boston Herald, January 31, 1948. 
4/ July 1, 1959. 
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mitous, but whether or not a strike was imminent. 0~ course 
it is impossible to say that there would not have been a 
strike, but the facts of the matter indicate that a strike 
would have been utterly absurd for all parties. Just 
be~ore State seizure, the dispute amounted to 21 and three 
years service for an allowance of a three-weeks' vacation. 
A~ter stating that no strike plans had been made, would the 
union for the amount involved, suddenly change its mind and 
call a wildcat strike which would bring disfavor cf the 
international union, would wreck its name with the public, 
and with the oven repair required after the strike would 
cause considerable layoff time? For the amount invOlved, 
would management ~ail to come to terms i~ it meant that most 
o~ its ovens would be ruined, customer good will would 
certainly be damaged, and that, with a long period required 
to reinstate service, revenue would certainly suffer? This 
writer thinks not. I~ the union had a history o~ irrespon-
sible actions, or if the period during the last days o~ the 
old contract was marked by heated argument and uncontrolled 
emotions, one might be inclined to take a more cautious 
view. However, this was not the case, and this writer con-
cludes that in this instance there was not any real need. 
~or the use of seizure power. 
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New England Electric System - Third case. 
For the next five years, the Slichter Act was not used. 
With the turn to a new administration in 1953 under 
Governor Christian Herter, however, the Slichter Act 
soon came into active use again. On February 17, 1953, 
about one thousand employees of the New England Electric 
System (gas distribution facilities) began walking off 
their jobs, leaving the supervisors to maintain service 
to the twenty-one communities served. In this case, however, 
interruption of service was not imminent, for this was 
only a distributing plant, and service could have been, 
and in fact was for a while, maintained temporarily by 
supervisory personnel. Immediate government action was not 
called for. 
Nevertheless, Governor Herter swiftly invoked the 
Slichter Act and appointed William G. Sutcliffe, Dean of the 
College of Business Administration at Boston University, 
to be Moderator. This automatically stopped the strike. 
One newspaper account stated that if a strike took place, 
service might be affected only during "peak load" hours.l 
Another reported that spokesmen for the company bad em-
phasized that department heads and supervisors would 
"maintain complete service" to the customers."2 Settlement 
of this dispute was made on March 3 by collective bargaining. 
l/ Boston Globe, February 17, 1953. 
2/ Medford Mercury, February 17, 1953. 
There were no important complications in the settle-
ment, and one editorial writer commented: "Here is an 
1,8. 
example of how orderly government can operate in a crisis 
when an executive who does not subordinate the public 
welfare to political exegencies is at the controls."l 
Concurrent with the New England Electric System strike, 
it is interesting to note, the Raverill Gas Light Company 
narrowly averted a walkout. The newspaper account of this 
dispute stated, however, that this was just a gas dis-
tributing facility which could be maintained by super-
visors, so use of the Slichter Act was doubted.2 This 
' seems strangely inconsistant to this writer, for the 
Raverill Gas Light Company and the New England Electric 
System disputes both involved essentially the same type of 
plant. The Haverill dispute, in addition to others of 
similar character which will be cited later in this and the 
next chapter, points up the fact that a strike in .a public 
utility does not necessarily mean public emergency. 
Worcester Gas-Ligpt Company - Fourth Case. 
On March 1, 1953, the Slichter Act was invoked for 
the fourth time when members of United Mine Workers, 
District 50, started a strike at the Worcester Gas Light 
Company, which served about 76,000 customers in 31 mid-
1/ Lynn Item, Editorial, February 18, 1953. 
2/ Haverrrr-Gazette, February 20, 1953. 
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Massachusetts communities. This case was similar to that 
of the New England Electric System in that the use of the 
Slichter Act seemed unnecessary because service could have 
been maintained by the plant supervisors. 
The Rev. Hubert c. Callaghan, s. J. was appointed 
Moderator. On March 18, he reported to the Governor 
that both ~rties refused to arbitrate, and on the fol-
lowing day Herter issued seizure orders. The Company 
contended that arbitration would "give a third party our 
exercise of judgement," and the union said, " ••• impos-
sible ••• because we don't think any third party could view 
the situation and say whether a person should get so much 
money or not so much money."l Early in the dispute the 
company was quoted as saying that in the event of a strike, 
gas would continue to flow to the homes served by the 
company, as natural gas is supplied to it by the North-
eastern Gas Transmission Company. A continuing strike 
ultimately would affect customers requiring repair of 
facilities and other service work.2 The President of the 
company, Richard Rutherford, stated that every effort would 
be made to continue normal operations and service with 
1/ Boston American, March 19, 1953. 
2/ Boston Post, March 2, 1953. 
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supervisory employees.l A strike principally would affect 
appliance adjusting, meter reading and billing.2 The 
dispute was finally settled by collective bargaining, over 
a month after it began, on May 11. The union came out 
rather well with a 19t package increase which compared with 
their original demand for 22t and the company offer of 13t• 
The first two uses of the Slichter Act in 1953 raise 
that question of whether or not a strike in a public utility 
would automatically produce a public emergency. From 
statements made by the company officers and others3 it 
would seem that for a period of time, at least, there would 
have been no emergency and no need to use the Slichter Act6 
At this point such statements may seem somewhat conjec-
tural; however, reference will be made later to other sit-
uations where a strike actually did occur in such a utility 
and lasted for twenty-seven days with no apparent ill result. 
Milk Companies - Fifth case. 
The strike of the Teamsters, Milk Wagon Driver's Local 
(A.F.L. ), against twelve Boston milk companies which 
started suddenly on April 9, 1953, presents the most ex-
tensive use of the Slichter Act. The question in this case 
is not, as in the previous public utility cases, whether or 
not the public health and safety would be jeoparidized even 
1/ Boston Globe, March a, 1953. 
2/ Worcester TeleRram, March 2, 1953. 
3/ see c~orge P. Shultz ~· £!!; and Charles Roche, "Report 
from the State House," the Boston !:2..!!..:!: March 15, 1953. 
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supply were interrupted. This writer concludes that 
because alternative supplies of milk were available and 
supplies of fresh milk substitutes were abundant no real 
threat to the public was involved. The only question was 
one of convenience. 
On the day that the strike was started, union officials 
assured the Chairman of the Milk Control Board that del-
iveries would be continued to hospitals, rest homes, and 
religious institutions. 1 Political observers, however, 
eyed the situation cautiously and indicated that that the 
Governor probably could invoke the Slichter law. The 
union insisted that the situation lay outside the authority 
of that law.2 The union indicated a willingness to arbi-
trate the dispute, but the companies stated that since they 
were ·already paying more than competing firms, &~DD "our 
cost situation makes anything beyond a renewal of the last 
contract impossible. 11 3 Also at issue was the compant pl~ 
of eliminating Sunday deliveries. 
After the milk strike had run four days, Governor 
Herter invoked the Slichter Act and named Mark E. Gallagher 
as Moderator. It was reported that there was a delay in 
this invocation because the Commissioner of Labor and 
1/ Boston Traveler, April 9, 1953. 
2/ Boston American, April 10, 1953. 
3/ Boston Herald, April 12, 1953. 
Industries had refused to certify the dispute to the 
Governor, maintaining that no emergency existed.l The 
~. 
same report also stated that a survey of the greater Boston 
area indicated that milk was available, although some 
shopping around might be required. The previous day, one 
of the struck companies was selling milk at its plant, 
processed by supervisors, and officers of the company 
said that no one was turned away empty handed. Another 
survey revealed that the supply of evaporated and condensed 
milk was sufficient for several weeks, even though demand 
had been unprecedented.2 Other companies, primarily Hood, 
ordinarily supplying between a half and two-thirds of 
greater Boston's milk, increased their deliveries to retail 
stores considerably during the strike period. 
More than a month after his appointment, the Mod-
erator reported to the Governor on May 17 that he was un-
able to resolve the dispute and could not even get the 
parties to agree on the points at issue. Herter then 
appointed three man emergency arbitration board and gave 
it the task of establishing grounds for arbitration with a 
report to be made in sixty days. One member of this board, 
Dean Rogers. Hamilton, stated to this writer in an inter-
view that the board actually had very few meetings and that 
1/ Boston Record, April 14, 1953. 
2/ Boston Globe, April 13, 1953. 
the hearings that were held were mainly "sparring bouts." 
There was a lot of talk, he said, but neither management, 
union, nor members of the board were able to come to terms 
about anything. He also said that the Commissioner of Labor 
and Industries felt that the primary value of the hearings 
was to provide a cooling-off period and that "things might 
work out" if the talks were kept up long enough. Although 
the tenure of the board expired on July 17, the parties 
agreed to have it continue on a voluntary basis. Finally 
on July 31, negotiations broke down entirely and the board 
submitted its report stating that they were unable to agree 
on the "wording of issues!'l The union gave its strike 
notice for midnight that day, and this was followed quickly 
by seizure ordera issued before the strike deadline. 
During the first week of September, Governor Herter 
appointed a special commission under the Slichter Act, 
which "he thought" would meet the approval of both parties. 
There had been some objection to the previous board partially 
because the one member representing the public, Dean 
Hamilton, headed a college of business administration and 
hence, the union reasoned, might be more sympathetic to a 
management point of view. The special commission was ex-
pected to begin hearings on October 1.2 The recommenda-
tions of the special commission were never issued, but 
1/ Boston Herald, August 1, 1953. 
2/ Lowell Sun, September 8, 1953. 
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instead the companies and union voluntarily agreed to a 
basis for arbitration. On December 24 the Governor announced 
the agreement and ended the State seizure of the companies. 
In January an arbitration board, made up of the same mem-
bers as of the special commission, handed down its unan-
imous decision, granting a weekly increase of $,5.,50 to pro-
duction workers and $2.50 to all others. Also several 
fringe benefits were in the award, including 4~ per hour 
for health and welfare purposes. The companies and the 
union had previously agreed voluntarily to accept as final 
the award of the arbitration board. Said the union: "although 
Local 380 gained important benefits from the decision, the 
entire history of the milk dispute, with all the delays and 
ineffective seizure, illustrates some of the defects in the 
Slichter law. nl 
In this dispute, all procedures of the Slichter Act 
were used save one, compulsory imposition of the rec-
ommendations of the special commission, and the exercise 
of this procedure was not missed by much• To what extent 
the use of the Slichter Act either helped or hindered 
settlement of the dispute is difficult to determine. In 
reviewing the history of the case, however, it would certain-
ly be difficult to say that use of the Act was a great suc-
cess in this case. But more to the point, the question is, 
1/ The Reporter, Massachusetts Federation of Labor, 
January 1954, P• 6. 
did it protect the public health and safety? As with most 
of the cases discussed thus far, there is really no evid-
ence to show that an emergency would have existed had the 
strike been allowed to run its cours~ Indeed, the evidence 
points to the contrary. With better than half of the re-
gular supply of milk still intact, with an adequate supply 
of milk substitutes, and with the union guaranteeing con-
tinued supply to hospitals and other institutions, it seems 
excessive to call this milk strike a menace to the public 
health and safety. Another writer on this dispute con-
cluded that although with some inconvenience and personal 
effort those who really needed milk could certainly have 
obtained it.l From the facts at hand, this writer must agree. 
Montaup Electric Company - Sixth Case 
The sixth and last invocation of the Slichter Act 
to date was brought forth when a strike was called by 175 
workers of the Montaup Electric Company, supplying 
electricity to about 120,000 customers in the Fall River 
and Brockton, Massachusetts, and Pawtucket and Woonsocket, 
Rhode Island. The use of the Slichter Act in this case, 
like those of the gas distributing companies previously 
mentioned, was not necessary in the view of this writer• 
As will be shown, a strike in itself would not have resulted 
in a serious interruption of service. 
1/ Shultz, George Pl, 2£• £!i•• P• 368. 
Isadore Levin was named Moderator under the Act on 
June 25, 1953. The union was demanding a 20 per cent 
increase plus nine fringe benefits; the company had 
offered an increase of 6 per cent, certain of the fringe 
benefits, and indicated that it would be willing to 
arbitrate.l It was reported that the supervisory employees 
could maintain no more than 50 per cent capacity in this 
wholesale distribution plant.2 The work of the Moderator 
ended without success, the company only willing to ar-
bitrate with the board selected by the Governor, and the 
Union willing to arbitrate only under a board selected form a 
standard conciliation service list. The Governor then. 
appointed an emergency arbitration board on July 14 and 
allowed it 30 days to submit a report. This board never 
held hearings on the merits of the dispute but did get the 
parties to agree to permit that board to arbitrate specified 
issues if the board worked privately and not under control 
of the Slichter Act. This was accomplished and the board 
awarded the workers a 6 per cent increase and two of the nine 
fringe benefits.3 
Assuming that this strike had actually occurred and 
that the projected 50 per cent reduction in service resulted 
1/ Boston Post, June 26, 1953. 
2/ Fall River-Herald-News, July 3, 1953. 
3/ Brockton Enterprise, September 8, 1953. 
in jeopardizing the health and safety of the public, one 
could say that the Slichter Act in this situation would 
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have afforded protection to the public. Fortunately for the 
sake of this argument, however, about two and one half 
years later a strike actually did occur in this plant on 
April 17, 1956, and supervisory workers did maintain the 
normal supply of electricity. In this second strike, State 
Representative Sission urged the Governor to use the Slichter 
Act, stating that "with 30 men attempting to substitute for 
170, I fear the possibility of a breakdown,l However, 
the Slichter Act was not used, the public health and 
safety did not suffer, and union and management somehow 
settled the dispute without any of the compulsory features 
of the Slichter Act. 
Conclusions. 
Governor Herter, after being in office eleven months 
and using the Slichter Act four times, was pleased with the 
results of the law, stating that it worked for the benefit 
of both labor and industry and might well be studied for 
use by other states and the federal government,2 In June 
of the following year, 1954, he signed an amendment to the 
law which added the provisions discussed in Chapter Two, 
primarily designed to extend the choice of procedures of the 
Governor and to provide a proceedure for investigating the 
1/ Boston Globe, April 21, 1953, 
2/ Mills, Edgar M., Christian Science Monitor, November 5, 
1953· 
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extent of danger involved to the public health and safety 
in a labor dispute. 
This writer, however, does not share Governor Herter's 
enthusiasm for the Slichter Act. The review of the six 
cases in which the Act was used shows that there has not 
been a clear cut case for its necessity. In the Trucker's 
Association and Milk Companies disputes, the amount and 
nature of service interruption could not reasonably be 
termed a threat to the public health and safety. The 
Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates dispute could have been a 
threat if a strike resulted, but the evidence is that in fact 
a strike was not contemplated. In the remaining three cases, 
Worcester Gas-Light, New England Electric System, and 
Montaup Electric, a strike would not necessarily have 
caused a substantial interruption of service, for·experience 
has shown that in distributing companies, the supervisory 
staff is generally quite capable of maintaining services 
for a temporary period of time. 
In all six cases, final settlement of the dispute was 
reached ottside of the provisions of the Slichter Act. The 
first four cases were settled by collective bargaining, and 
the last two by voluntary arbitration with the arbitration 
boards acting as private groups. A more detailed analysis 
of the Slichter Act as a settlement mechanism will be made in 
Chapter Four. ' 
Since the record shows that use of the Slichter Act 
has not been required for public protection, the con-
clusion seems almost •nevitable that at best the Act has 
been superfluous. However, this may be like saying that 
since no one drowned in the swimming pool today, the em-
ployment of a life guard was a waste of money. So, in the 
next chapter a general appraisal will be made of the 
Slichter Act, and the value of the Act, as such, will be 
considered in a broader perspective. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SLIGHTER ACT AS A PUBLIC PROTECTOR 
AND AS A SETTLEMENT MECHANISM 
Introduction 
T~e stated objective of the Slichter Act is to 
60. 
protect the health and safety of the public from threats, 
which might arise through labor disputes, to the continued 
supply of specified critical goods and services. An implicit 
objective of the Act also is to provide this protection 
while maintaining at the same time the beat interests 
of both labor and management; this means that it purports 
to be a satisfactory settlement mechanism. It is the 
purpose of this chapter to appraise the Slichter Act and 
to determine how well these two objectives have been 
carried out. The dapter will be divided into two major 
sections: the first will appraise how well the Slichter 
Act has performed as a public protector; the second will 
appraise the Act as a settlement mechanism. 
6J.. 
I - A PUBLIC PROTECTOR 
Summary 
It as been shown that the six cases in which the 
Slichter Act was used, there was not a clear need for it. 
This section will consider those situations in which the 
Act was not used but where it was requested or considered 
applicable. It will be shown that in these cases the 
use of the Slichter Act either was not required or was 
inappropriate. Also, it will be shown that if a real need 
for public protection had arisen, the protection offered 
by the Slichter Act would only have been duplication of other 
existing statutes. 
Periods of Disuse 
In the history of the Slichter Act, there are tiD 
rather long periods of disuse, one between 1948 and 
1953, embracing the administration of Governor Dever, 
and a second, 1954 to date, which roughly corresponds with 
the administration of Governor Furcolo. During these two 
periods, this writer found accounts of si~teen disputes in 
which consideration was given to the use of the Slichter Act. 
In six of these disputes, the situation apparently was not 
serious enough to warrant government action; in four the 
Act was inapplicable; and in six settlement was reached 
before a strike actually resulted. 
In the six eases where settlement was made, or 
the strike called off, it might be said that the mere 
existance of the Slichter Act prevented any trou~le 
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from occurring, In all of these cases, however, the 
potential threat to the public health and safety was 
lacking; and in the view of this writer, these cases would 
have been very similar to those described in Chapter Three. 
The following two cases are typical of those where a strike 
never developed and illustrate well the influence of the 
mere existance of the Slichter Act. 
In March of 1948, a threat of a jurisdictional strike 
of 25 A.F.L. engineers and firemen at the Everett plant 
of the Boston Consolidated Gas Company was disclosed by the 
Commissioner of Labor and Industry. This was a gas dis-
tributing plant and could be operated by supervisors with 
no interruption in the supply of gas, and so the State 
announced that it contemplated no action. Nonetheless, 
a spokesman of the union of operating engineers stated 
that the situation was serious and that "people could lose 
their lives if the pressure in gas mains were dropped." 
He criticized the Governor for not acting. The international 
representative added: "We are amazed at the lack o1' interest 
shown by the Governor."l This rather obvious attempt of the 
union to use the Slichter Act to further its own ends fell 
to naught and the strike threat evaporated. 
1/ Boston Globe, March 12, 1948. 
A year later, another similar case arose. The . 
workers of the Lynn Gas and Electric Company called a 
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strike, but qualified it to the extent that they would 
keep enough manpower on duty to assure that the public 
would not be inconvenienced.! Previously the press had 
reported that both the company end the union "sense their 
responsibilities to all parties concerned and their ob-
ligation to render gas and electric services •••• n2 
Management, however, viewed the situation somewhat differ-
ently and in full page advertisements in the local papers 
declared that any sort of partial manning of the plant was 
impossible and would "endanger the health, welfare and safe-
ty of the communities.3 Although there was no specific 
mention of the Slichter Act, the phrase9logy of the union 
and management statements revealed rather clearly what was 
on their minds. The State House was equally cozy in its 
approach and stated publicly only that the Governor, who 
was in Washington at the time, "would be kept informed." 
After two strike postponements, settlement was made with-
out a strike in an eleventh hour session. 
The six cases in which the situation was not serious 
enough, even by State House standards, to warrant government 
1/Lynn Item, February 23, 1949. 
2/ Lynn-refegra~h-News, February 18, 1949. 
3/ Lynn Item, A vertisement, February 23, 1949. 
action concerned public utility distributing plants for 
the most part. After the Slichter Act invocations in 1953, 
the standards of "seriousnes" seem to have changed, for 
some of the utility strikes that were not deemed serious 
after 1953 were really very little different from some 
of these in which the Act was used. The MontEUp Electric 
Company case is a good example of this. As was described 
in Chapter Three, the Act was invoked in a threatened 
strike in 1953, but three years later a strike was allowed 
to run its course at the same plant. As far as this 
writer could determin4 no changes had been made which 
would make the two situations any different. Two further 
examples follow of the not-serious-enough type, one a 
utility and one involving food distribution. 
In Janua~ 1957, a strike was called by the workers 
of the Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, the same company 
that was seized under the Slichter Act early in 1948. 
Since that time, however, the company had changed its 
operations. It had ceased its gas manufacturinz operations, 
and now operated only a distributing plant for natural gas 
supplied from outside the state. When the strike was first 
called, there was some speculation that use of the Slichter 
Act might be forthcoming. No government action was taken, 
however, and the strike ran its course. Supervisors were 
able to maintain the supply of gas satisfactorily, and no 
emergency resulted. As a matter of fact, there was not even 
any significant inconvenience to the public.l 
The second example of the strike not serious enough 
to warrent state intervention occurred on March 10, 1949, 
when about one hundred A.F.L. Freight Handlers walked 
off their jobs in the North End produce district and stalled 
the movement of a reported $100,000 worth of perishable 
fruits and vegatables. The next day, the New Bedford 
standard-Times reported that the strike ended 24 hours 
after it began and that the end came "as state officials 
were considering seizure of the terminal under the Slichter 
Act•: In as much as this was not reported in the other 
newspaper accounts of the strike, this writer suspects that 
state House consideration of seizure may have been only 
the reporters imaginative transcription of the wishful 
thinking of a terminal manager. However, even though the 
food industry is covered by the Slichter Act, a strike of 
this nature would not threaten the public health and safety. 
The amount and type of food involved could not with any 
prudence be considered essential to the public. Were this 
mountain of fruits and vegetables allowed to remain un-
moved for any period of time, however, this writer imagines 
that a rather delicate sanitation problem might have developed. 
During the periods when the Slichter Act was not 
used, an examination of cases shows that the protective 
aspects of the Act were not called for. In those cases 
1/ Shultz, George P., ~· £!!•• p. 369. 
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where settlement was reached before the dispute came to 
an actual work stoppage. it was reasonably clear that 
the parties involved were using the Slichter Act as a 
lever to further their own purposes. It cannot be said 
that the public was given any protection in these cases, 
for the strike was threatened only under the assumption 
that the Slichter Act would prevent it. When it was seen 
that the Act would not be used, the strike threat vanished. 
A further example of this will be cited in the second sec-
tion of this chapter. The situations described where the 
strike occurred and the Slichter Act was not used need 
little comment. Since the circumstances of these strikes 
in fact involved no threat to the public, there obviously 
was no need for protection under the Slichter Act. 
If the situation arose during the periods of disuse 
described above in which a strike in a public interest 
industry actually posed a threat to the public health and 
safety, and the Slichter Act were not used, it might be 
concluded that the Act was needed for public protection. 
However, since such a circumstance did not arise, it still 
must be concluded that the exist;l.nce of the Act has not 
been necessary. 
Coverage of the Act 
The remaining cases during the periods of disuse, those 
in which the Act was not applicable, leave the possibility 
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that the coverage of the apt is too narrow, and that 
perhaps there are some areasof experience in which the 
public health and safety needed protection. Four instances 
were found where extension of the Act was actually re-
quested, one involving a newspaper strike and three in-
volving separate strikes of the Eastern Massachusetts Street 
Railway Co. These cases will now be described, and the 
possible need for public protection will be examined. 
Throughout the history of the Slichter Act, the press 
has favored its use generally, and in August of 1957 it 
found itself tooting its own horn rather loudly when the 
distribution workers of the Boston Globe, Boston Herald, 
amd Boston American, went out on strike. Representatives 
of each of these newspapers requested the Governor to 
extend the Slichter Act to cover newspapers as "essential 
to liberty and safety and general welfare of the public." 
They termed this strike as a precedent which could "stifle 
the voice of the press."l The Monitor, which was not 
affected by the strike, however, sagely noted that "Few 
Americans would want Government empowered to seize and 
"2 run newspape~ This writer can sympathize with the 
newspaper representatives in wanting to maintain the dis-
tribution facilities of their newspapers, but the wisdom of 
the Monitor comment seems more convincing. 
1/ Brockton Ehterprise, August 18, 1957. 
2/ The Christian Science Monitor, August 30, 1957. 
68. 
Regardless of the philosophical issues involved, however, 
the practical aspect that there are so many alternative 
sources of news available (magazines, other newspapers, 
radio, and T.V.) would make it impossible to establish the 
argument that a public threat exists in such a strike. 
A more crucial test of the coverage of the Slichter 
Act came in June of 1949 with a strike of 2200 employees 
of the Eastern Massachusetts Railway Co. The current 
Governor of Massachusetts, Paul Dever, had gone into office 
on a rather strong pro-labor platform --- a platform, in-
cidentally, which omitted repeal of the Slichter Act for 
which labor agents had filed legislation.l The strike was 
started over the public plea of Gov. Dever and direct orders 
of the international union to "go back to work." After the 
strike had continued for 8 days, the Governor threatened to 
request special legislation, recognizing that the Slichter 
Act did not apply to this strike. The next day the strike 
ended, and was not generally regarded as a victory for the 
union.2 The actual outcome of this strike is not particular-
ly important here, but what is important is the recognition 
of this limitation on the coverage of the Act. 
Almost three years later the same strike situation 
boiled up again, and this limitation was reaffirmed, both 
1/ Mullins, w. E., Boston Herald, December 
2/ Weiss, Lawrence, "Peace 7 but no victory Boston Herald, June 12, 1949• 
17, 1948. 
for the union." 
in terms of existing legislation and new legislation. 
Although the Slichter Act does not specifically exclude 
~. 
public transportation, the report of the original Governor's 
Committee spelled this out quite clearly: "An interruption 
of other important types of service, such as street railway 
and bus transportation or telephone service, would disrupt 
production ~d cause inconvenience and economic loss far 
beyond strikes and lockouts in most other industries. Never-
theless, they would not jeopardize the public health and 
safety.nl During this second strike, however, the press 
became quite impatient and clamored for government action, 
apparantly not too concerned with the limitations of the 
Slichter Act. "This situation simply cannot be permitted to 
continue, even if it means that the State Government must 
intervene to keep the buses moving."2 stated one. "Although 
it is not certain whether or not the Slichter Act applies to 
this strike ••• Governor Dever has made it clear that he will 
not act in any way that might cost him a labor vote and the 
public be damned, 11 3 stated another. But, insisted Dever, 
"There is no legal power to compel the resumption of trans-
portation •••• The Governor has no jurisdiction to order the 
bus drivers back to their jobs. 114 
1/Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Report of the Governor's 
Labor-Management Committee, March 18, 1947, House Document 
No. 1875, pp. 20-21. 
2/Boston Post, Editorial, March 11, 1952. 
)/ Editorrar, "Dever Dallies," Boston Herald, March 13, 1952. 
4/ Boston American, March 26, 1952. 
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Midst the clamor to "do somethiqf and the counter-
clamor of "I don't have the authority," it appeared that 
the only person who offered any positive course of action 
was Rev. Lawrence Blackburn of Lowell, who sent the fol-
lowing telegram to the Governor and others: "You will be 
pleased to know that beginning Monday noon at st. Anne's 
Episcopal Church in Lowell we shall offer 24 hours of 
continuous and impartial prayer for the early and complete 
settlement of the bus strike."l 
After this bus strike had rolled on for about two 
months, Governor Dever called for special legislation 
which would allow him to sei·ze the bus lines and if nee-
essary require compulsory arbitration. It is interesting 
to note that Dever would not make this recommendation 
without the approval of the State Federation of Labor.2 
This approval was given reluctantly on May 12 and finally 
legislation got to the floor of the Democratic House on 
June 6. Following six hours of "torrid" debate, the legis-
lation was voted down 146 to 75.3 The Union and management 
finally came to terms on July 17, after more than four months 
of strike. The workers were granted a 151 increase, 2p 
more than the company offered before the strike began, and 
were faced with the unhappy fact that it would take them 
1/Lowell Sun, March 17, 1952. 
2/ Eames, Stanley, Boston Herald, May 12, 1952. 
3/ Boston Globe, June 6, 1952. 
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four years to make up what they had lost in wages. The 
strike also cost the national union about $i million, the 
bus companies $3 to 4 million in revenue, and incalculable 
business losses and public aggravation.l It also might 
be noted that according to John Callahan, Department of 
Labor and Industries Commissioner, it also cost Dever his 
re-election. 
A third strike of the Eastern Massachusetts bus 
drivers came in late 1958, and settlement was not reached 
until mid-1959. The pattern and issues of this strike were 
much the same as. in the previous one and do not need an 
elaborate description. Four separate pieces of legislation 
were proposed to extend the Slichter Act to cover this 
strike,2 but neither the Democratic House nor Senate would 
~rmit suspension of the rules to allow consideration of 
this legislation. When the strike was over it undoubtedly 
had been very costly to all concerned again, and it was 
generally considered that the bus drivers gained nothing 
from the strike. 
These three bus strikes, the last two in particular, 
were undoubtedly the most troublesome and costly ot: all 
strikes considered here. The second of these was termed 
• 
1/ Lynn Item, July 17, 1952. 
2/ Sponsored by Rep. Giles (R), Sen. Hedges (R), Sen. 
Hogan (D), and Sen. Lamson (R). 
72. 
"the worst strike in the history of the Commonwealth." 
When they were over, however, there was no evidence that 
there had been any jeopardy of the public health and 
safety.l Also, since the Massachusetts legislature voted 
down the many attempts to extend the coverage of the 
Slichter Act, it would seem that there was not a great 
amount of public pressure demanding protection. Com-
missioner of Labor and Industries John A. Callahan stated 
to this writer that even the representatives from these 
areas most seriously affected by the strike voted against 
extension of the Slichter Act. The only proper conclusion 
seems to be that protection of the Slichter Act is not 
appropriate to these strikes. 
Duplicate Legislation 
In the Section on the "Periods of Disuse," it was 
stated that if a strike had occurred in which the public 
health and safety was threatened, then perhaps an argument 
might be built in support of the Slichter Act. In this 
section, however, it will be shown that even for protection 
in a real emergency strike, there is no need for special 
legislation like the Slichter Act. 
In Massachusetts law there exists quite apart from the 
Slichter Act provisions to cope with disaster situations, 
among which can be included labor disputes. Section 9H of 
1/, Shultz, George P., £E• ill•• P• 369. 
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Chapter 23 of the General Laws reads: 
Whenever the Governor shall determine that an 
emergency exists in respect to food or fuel or any 
other common necessity of life ••• he may with the ap-
proval of the council ••• designate the adjutant general, 
the commissioner of labor and industries and the 
commissioner of public safety to act as an emergency 
commission, and thereupon the commission shall have 
••• all the powers and authority granted by the common-
wealth defense act of nineteen hundred and seventeen ••• 1 
Section 6 of the Commonwealth Defense Act of 1917 reads: 
Whenever the governor shall believe it necessary 
or expedient for the purpose of better securing 
the public safety or the defense or welfare of 
the commonwealth, he may with the approval of the 
council take possession: a/ of any land or buildings, 
machinery or equipment; b( of any horses, vehicles, 
motor vehicles, aeroplanes, ships, boats, or any 
other ~eans of conveyance, rolling stock of steam 
or electric railroads or of street railways; c/ 
of any cattle, poultry and any provisions for man 
or beast, and any fuel, gasoline or other means of 
propulsion ••• for the better protection of the 
commonwealth or its inhabitants. He may use and 
employ all property so taken possession of for the 
service of the commonwealth or of the United States, 
for such times and in such manner as he shall deem 
for the inte~sts of the commonwealth or its in-
habitants •••• 
These statutes, as pointed out by the special committee 
appointed by Governor Bradford, give broad powers to the 
Governor. The Governor's authority to deal with emergencies 
affecting "any common necessaries of life" would, according 
to these statutes, include seizure authority and could be 
used to halt any interruption of the supply of essential 
goods or services. The committee also stated that "the powers 
1/ As quoted by Commonwealth of Massachusetts House 
Document No. 1875. March, 1947, pp. 23-24. 
2/ 1£!.8.· 
• granted to the Governor by these statutes are presumably 
also adequate to deal with strike situations."l As far 
as government seizure is concerned, which is the only 
part of the Slichter Act that has any teeth in it, 
authority is already vested in the executive, and the 
provisions of the Slichter Act concerning seizure are 
actually a duplication, even though in somewhat more 
modern language, of existing legislation. 
It has been shown that during the twelve years of 
the Slichter Act, there has been no real need for it 
on the basis of the cases that have been examined. It 
can now be stated that there was no need of the Slichter 
Act on the basis of cases that could have occurred. 
Although if a disaster strike had occurred during this 
period, it is likely that the Slichter Act would have been 
used; however, had this Act not existed, the necessary 
authority to handle the situation would have existed in the 
alternative legislation cited above. 
Conclusions 
In this section of this chapter, the Slichter Act 
as a public protector has been appraised. In Chapter 
Three it was established that the Act was unnecessary in 
the cases where it actually was used. In this chapter, 
it has been shown that in the cases where it was not 
1/ l.£!.2• P• 25. 
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used and could not be used, there appeared no need for 
it. Also, it was shown that alternative legislation was 
available for an extreme situation that might have arisen. 
It cannot be said that the Act failed to give public 
protection, for in fact no protection was required. However, 
it can be concluded that the Act did not !£2 any im-
portant degree of protection to the public health and 
safety. 
II - A SETTLEMENT MECHANISM 
Summary 
This section will examine a second criterion ibr 
evaluating the Slichter Act: its success as a mechanism 
for settling labor disputes which are affected with a 
public interest. In order for a settlement mechanism to 
be successful, it should have the confidence of both 
union and management. It will be shown here, though, 
that both have publicly criticized the Act, yet on many 
occasions have used it .to further their own ends, showing 
that little faith in the Act exists. Also, it will be 
shown that the Slichter Act encourages the introduction of 
political considerations in disputes and thus tends to 
confuse the issues. Finally, actual results obtained in 
the six uses of the Act will be reviewed. 
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tabor's Public Position 
The voices of labor have loudly critic~zed the Slichter 
Act and legislation of like character in other states since 
they came into existance. The primary objection on the 
part of labor is that anything which interferes with its 
right to strike removes its strongest weapon and hence its 
position at the collective bargaining table is seriously 
weakened. The steelworkers in oral argument before the 
Supreme Court stated that Government seizure has brought 
a "dras,tic alteration •••• of the balance of power in the 
collective bargaining relationship ••• Without the possibility 
of a strike, the bargaining power of labor shrinks."l 
In addition to disturbing the balance of power, government 
intervention is also likely to alter the pattern afbargain-
ing strategy; instead of being a two-way dispute, it becomes 
three-way. "Labor and management devise strategy in ant-
icipation of the strategy of government---and vice versa ••• 
Traditional collective bargaining issues tend to be sub-
merged by political conflicts, and the positions of the 
parties reflect their alignment within the political com-
munity rather than customary economic valuations."2 Also, 
unions feel that when government does influence settlement,· 
or dictates a settlement when compulsory arbitration is 
1/ As quoted by Harold L. Enarson, "The Politics of an 
Emergency Dispute," in Bernstein et al eds., 2£• £!1., p. 65. 
2/ Enarson, Harold L., ~· £1!.,-p.~?. 
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used, the result is not likely to give proper weight to 
the collective bargaining history and the special consider-
ations of the industry and particular dispute. 1 
This issue of a third party being strictly personna 
~ grata came up in the hearings of the milk dispute in 
which the Slichter Act was invoked. Here, it was pointed 
out, both labor and management felt that the intracacies 
of the situation were not appreciated by the Moderator and 
certainly could not be properly handled by an arbitration 
board. 
Labor's Private Position 
In contrast to the rather vehement attitudes of labor 
on the Slichter Act, however, actual experience has shown 
that labor in many instances has found the Act to be 
quite useful to it. If a union is reasonably certain of 
government intervention, they can be quite free in making 
demands and do not have to face up to the sometimes very 
costly aspects of a strike. Counsellor O'Connell of the 
Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries stated to 
this writer that in many circumstances the union has "loved" 
the Slichter law. The union leaders can make excessive 
demands, knowing that under given circumstances the Governor 
will step in and save them from having to backwater in order 
1/ Report issued by fact-finding board and made public by 
the Secretary of tabor as quoted in Monthly Labor Review, 
63 (November 1946) P• 774• 
to hold the good graces of th~ir membership and the public. 
The press has stated: "Although labor leaders have publicly 
blasted the Governor's actions, they have privately thanked 
him. The Act has allowed them to get off the hook, has 
kept men on the job and created means by which agreement 
,, 
has been reached.l This public-private ambivalence of 
unions is further brought out by the approval of the Mass-
achusetts Federation of Labor given to Governor Dever's 
special, and ill-fated, legislation to extend the Slichter 
Act for the 1952 Eastern Massachusetts bus strike. At the 
same time, legislative agents of the union were pushing bills 
to repeal the Slichter Act. 
Consistant use of the Slichter Act would enable a 
union to predict reasonably well when the Act would be 
used, and it could then make any demands it wanted with-
out fear that the dispute would actually come to a strike. 
After the four invocations of the Act in 1953, unions felt 
fairly confident that its use would be continued in a con-
sistant manner, according to Mr. Robert Browning of the 
State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration. Although a 
shift in State House strategy foiled one union, its design 
to use the Slichter Act as protective covering is well il-
lustrated in 1954 by a threatened strike of 700 employees 
of the New Bedford Gas and Edison Co., Cape and Vineyard 
Electric co., and Plymouth Electric Co., serving about 
1/ Boston Herald, Editorial, January 4, 1954. 
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166,000 customers. Officials of the company stated that 
service would be continued in the event of a strike, and 
the State House stated that it did not contemplate any 
action.l Finding itself out on a limb, the union called 
off the strike one minute before deadline and stated to 
the press: 
In view of the fact that the Governor did not 
take any steps to protect the people against a 
shutdown, the union decided at 11:59 P.M. to 
cancel its strike action. 
The union would not do anything to cause 
disruption of service. I feel the Governor 
was derelict in his duty in refusing to invoke 
the~ichter (sic) Act ••• to eliminate the 
possibility of violence and to prevent the loss 
of vital service. 
The utility workers union never has and 
does not intend to strike against the people 
of Massachusetts.2 
Since the Slichter Act has not been used for six years, 
it is. obvious that no union would now include it in its 
strategy. However, during the period in 1953 when 
it was used, it did provide a neat escape hatch for the 
union. One writer maintains that government settlement 
mechanisms undermine self-government between labor and 
management and breeds irresponsibility. Since final 
authority can be placed in the government's lap in an 
emergency dispute, union responsibility can also be 
.transferred. 3 
1/ Boston Record, April 28, 1954• 
2/ Boston Post, May 1. 1954. 
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Management's Public Position 
Management attitudes are a little more difficult to 
state than those of the union. Generally, however, it 
may be said that industry is more favorably disposed to 
strike regulation than is labor. Legislative provisions are 
usually aimed at preventing labor from doing something, and 
.little, if any imposition is placed on management. Of course, 
most legislation states "strikes and lockouts," but as a 
practical matter any restriction on lockouts is not going 
to thwart the efforts .of management significantly.l The 
principal management objections, however, probably stem 
from the fear that government will tend to get too involved 
in the affairs of business. Even though originally confined 
to the relatively small sphere of public interest indlstries, 
management would be suspicious of this "omnivorous concept" 
and might visualize its spread to the entire business area. 
As Alexander Frey put it, the cure may become worse than the 
disease.2 Management would be jealous of any interposed 
authority, such as would be produced by seizure under the 
Slichter Act. In addition, the resulting adulteration of 
control of the business, plus the inevitable diversion of 
attention, might well lead to increased costs. Management 
also shares with the union the apprehension that government 
interferance may place it in a position less desirable than 
1/ Richberg, Donald R., "The Proposed Federal Industrial 
Relations Act," Political Science guarterly, LXI (June 1946) 
Po 204. 
2/Frey, Alexander H., "The Logic of Collective Bargaining and 
Arbitration," Duke University, Law and Contemporary Problems, 
12 (spring 1947) P• 270. 
it enjoyed in free exchange at the bargaining table. 
Management's Private Position 
Management, like the union, was shown itself not to 
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be adverse to using the Slichter Act for its own protection. 
The New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket 
Steamship Authority was successful in 1954 in getting the 
coverage of the Slichter Act extended to its operation, 
as outlined in Chapter Two. Like unions after the 1953 
uses of the Act, the Authority was confident of its use 
to halt a strike of the ship crews. According to Mr. 
Browning of the Arbitration and Conciliation Department, 
management felt in this case that they had little need 
to be cooperative w!. th the union. In August of 1955 
the strike was called for the ship crews. Noting the 
direction of the wind, however, the union was careful to 
maintain service which might be considered essential. 
Stated the chief union negotiator: "We don't want anyone on 
the island to be uncomfortable. Far be it from any union 
leader to want that," noting that a shipment of orthopedic 
mattresses was allowed to go to Nantucket.l No State 
action resulted, management discovered to its dismay, and 
tons of non-essential goods piled up on the docks. Although 
the management plot was frustrated, this case still il-
lustrates the rather devious attitudes taken by management 
1/ New Bedford Standard-Times, August 27, 1955. 
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in regard to the Slichter Act. The cat and mouse approach 
of both union and management might well have been avoided 
if the Slichter Act were not in the picture. 
Public utility management is in a rather special 
position and may find the Slichter Act useful for some 
likewise special reasons. Since,after all, utility rate 
schedules are pretty thoroughly policed by the government 
already, there is really not a very large area that gov-
ernment influence could spread from intervention in labor 
affairs. Also, since owners and managers of utilities are 
usually bound by law not to abandon service, what is so 
undesirable about placing the same restriction on labor?l 
Further, utility managers might feel that petitions for 
rate hikes would be much more convincing if they are doc-
umented by recent government induced wage hikes, and they 
might welcome the use of this lever. 
Thus, there is the tendency .for management, like 
unions, to use the Slichter Act as a strategic tool and 
not to regard it as a vehicle for improved industrial 
relations. Of course, in any industrial dispute it is 
only natural that each party should seek the most favorable 
terms of settlement for ita own group, and neither manage-
ment nor labor can be criticized for using the Slichter Act 
to this end. The Slichter Act used in this way, however, 
may only hinder final settlement by introducing extraneous 
1/ Richberg, Donald R., loc. cit., P• 204. 
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considerations and by decreasing the willingness or desire 
of the parties to reach a settlement. 
Political Influences 
Within the history of the Slichter Act, the two 
Republican Governors, Bradford and Herter, have stated 
that they approve of the act and between them account 
for all uses of the Act. The two Democratic Governors~ 
Dever and Furcolo, have not used the Act, but both have 
recommended its extension to the Eastern Massachusetts bus 
strikes. There is indication that they would have used 
the Act if the occasion had arisen. Charges have been 
made by the press that the Democratic Governors did not 
use the Act for fear that they might antagonize labor, 
but this writer found no strong support for this argument. 
Political alignment, real or alleged, with the Act 
can put the Governor in a difficult position in deciding 
whether or not it should be used. As was described, Governor 
Dever found himself in exactly this position, and it may 
have cost him his re-election. With pressures like this 
involved, it would not be surprising for the state executive to 
consider things other than industrial relations in deciding 
to use the Act. Also, with heavy pressures from union and 
management, it can well be imagined that a weak executive 
could have been coerced into some unfortunate used of the 
law, which could be intended to favor either labor or 
management. 
~. 
Settlement Experience 
A quick review of the six cases in which the Slichter 
Act was used will show that the final settlements had 
little to do with the use of the Act and in some cases 
may have been hindered by the Act. This general conclusion 
was reached at the end of Chapter Three, but here a some-
what more formal approach will be made. 
In the first invocation of the Slichter Act, the 
Trucker's Association dispute, the efforts of the Moderator 
to induce the parties to arbitrate were unsuccessful. The 
dispute was turned over to the State Board of Conciliation 
and Arbitration and settlement was finally reached with 
their help by collective bargaining. As mentioned previously, 
both the State Board and the Trucker's Union declared that· 
the use of the Slichter Act only delayed collective bargaining. 
The next three cases were quite similar in their 
settlement, concerning the Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, 
the New England Electric System, and the Worcester Gas-Light 
Company. In none was the Moderator successful in getting 
the dispute referred to arbitration. The New England E~ ctric 
System dispute was settled in about two weeks by collective 
bargaining without the Governor's seizure power being used. 
The industries involved in the other two disputes were 
seized by the state, but in the Eastern Gas and Fuel dispute 
the differences were so small between labor and management 
that settlement was reached by collective bargaining, within 
about two weeks. Settlement of the 'Norcester Gas-Light 
dispute was settled by collective bargaining also with-
out further provisions of the Slichter Act being used, 
but negotiations stretched out over slightly more than 
two months. 
Extensive use of the provisions of the Slichter Act 
were used in the Milk Companies dispute, but none brought 
settlement. The Moderator achieved nothing, and then 
under state seizure the efforts of an emergency arbitration 
board were not able to bring agreement on the issues in-
volved. The subsequent appointment of a special commission 
produced no observable results, for it never issued its 
recommendations. Finally, the union and management agreed 
by themselves to a basis for arbitration, and accepted the 
personnel of the special commission as an arbitration board 
acting in an independent capacity. The recommendations of 
this board were accepted. 
The appointment of a Moderator in the last case, 
Montaup Electric Company, proved to be of no help. After 
the failure of the Moderator, the Governor appointed an 
emergency arbitration board which never considered the merits 
of the dispute, but did get the parties to agree to accept 
it as a private arbitration board acting outside the pro-
visions of the Slichter Act. The decisions of this board 
were accepted by both labor and management. 
~. 
The most striking thing about a review of these 
cases is that in none of them did any of the provisions 
of the Slichter Act bring about settlement. Feeling was 
strong in the Trucker's case that the Act only delayed 
settlement, and in the Milk Companies dispute, which 
dragged on for over eight months, a good argument could 
be made that the elaborate use of the Act only prolonged 
negotiations interminably. The trio of utility cases was 
settled by collective b~rgaining with no particular help 
from the Slichter Act and without much hullabaloo. This 
writer concludes that the Act afforded no important 
help in settling the disputes in which it was used, and 
that in some of the cases it may have been an actual detriment. 
Conclusions 
In the second section of this chapter the Slichter 
Act as a settlement mechanism has been examined. It was 
seen that the attitudes of both labor and management were 
ambivalent and that they exhibited little confidence in 
the act. Abuse of the act by labor and management was 
pointed out, and the possibility of political influence was 
noted. An examination of the six uses of the Act revealed 
that it was of no observable assistance in settling the 
disputes and that it may have been an actual hinderance. 
Also in cases cited in both sections of this chapter, 
the Slichter Act was shown to be a disrupting influence 
in the relationship between union and management, and that 
it tended to alter the attitude toward collective 
bargaining. It is concluded that the Slichter Act 
has not shown itself to be a successful settlement 
mechanism. 
~-
Summary 
CF..APTER FIVE 
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF EXPERIENCE 
IN OTHER STAlES 
88. 
In this chapter, attention will be directed to 
experiences in others states which have laws designed to 
protect the public from interuptions in the supply of 
essential goods and services. The general content of these 
other laws will be examined and compared to the Slichter 
Act. The purpose here is to determine whether or not the 
different provisions of other state laws show any advantage 
over those of the Slichter Act. Although no general 
account of the use of these laws will be attempted, careful 
consideration will be given to certain court cases which 
questioned the constitutionality of these laws. By this, 
it will be shown that in the past cases of the Slichter Act 
its constitutionality .probably would not have been upheld 
in a court test. 
Content of Other State Laws 
A review of all state labor laws revealed that sixteen 
states, including Hawaii, had laws regulating strikes in 
public interest industries. The laws in two of these states, 
however, were not at all comprehensive: Texas has a law 
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restricting only the picketing of public utilities, and 
North Dakota provides, under military law, the authority 
for the Governor to seize industries in the public interest, 
Because of their limited nature, these statutes will be 
omitted from further discussion, Of the remaining four-
teen laws, eleven have provisions for compulsory arbitration, 
eleven provide for compulsory mediation, and seven permit 
emergency seizure of industry, 
All of the fourteen acts being considered cover the 
basic power utilities, with the exception of the Minnesota 
act, which is restricted to charitable hospitals, Eleven 
of the acts cover transportation and communication, and three 
specifically include hospitals, In a few of the states, 
strikes are forbidden in those industries covered by the law, 
such as Nebraska and Wisconsin; in the remaining states 
strikes are outlawed only when the provisions of the statute 
are invoked in a particular case, 
Although all the states provide either compulsory 
arbitration or seizure authority, they encourage voluntary 
settlement before such action is taken, A common phrase in 
these laws is that "it is the duty of the parties to the 
dispute to bargaining coll~ctively," The compulsory med-
Uft, 
iation provisions containedAeleven of the statutes are a 
further attempt to avoid such direct intervention as seizure 
or compulsory arbitration, The Pennsylvania law even 
~-
provides for a secret ballot to be taken of employees 
on whether or not to accept the best offer of management. 
Mediators are usually appointed by the Governor. In five 
of the states providing compulsory arbitration, the board 
of arbitration is appointed by the Governor, in three of 
the other states a labor court is established, and in the 
remaining states there are varying methods of labor and 
management participation in the selection of arbitration 
boards. Compulsory awards are normally binding for one 
year, unless a change is mutually agreed upon by both 
parties, and an appeal of the award can be made through 
the state courts. 
Of the fourteen laws under consideration, only nine 
are now usable. The Maryland act expired in 1953 by its 
own terms. The acts in four other states (Kansas, 
Wisconsin, Indiana, and Florida) have been declared uncon-
stitutional. As will be seen later in this chapter, use of 
the other acts, except under very special circumstances, 
is now apt to lead to their being declared unconstitutional 
also. A brief summary of all acts mentioned in this section 
is contained in Table V. 
Comparison with Slichter Act 
Although there are many minor variations between the 
Slichter Act and the acts in other states, two important 
and frequent differences stand out. Most of the other acts 
provide for compulsory arbitration, and most extend their 
9l. 
TABLE V 
STATE LAWS REGULATING STRIKES IN PUBLIC UTILITIES 
Compulsory Compulsory Special 
State Arbitration Mediation Seizure Coverage 
or Status 
Florida X X Unconsti-
tutional 
Hawaii X X Includes 
Stevedores 
Indiana X X Unconsti-
tutional 
Kansas X X X Unconsti-
tutional 
Massachusetts X X 
Maryland X X Expired 
1953 
Michigan X X 
Minnesota X X Hospitals 
Only 
Missouri X X X 
Nebraska X 
New Jersey X X X 
North Dakota X Military 
Authority 
Pennsylvania X X 
Texas Restrict 
Picketing 
Virginia X X 
Wisconsin X Unconsti-
tutional 
application to cover transportation and communication 
facilities. 
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It has been shown that provisions in the Slichter Act 
would permit the Governor to change conditions of employment 
in a seized plant upon recommendation of an emergency 
board of arbitration or a special commission, and these 
provisions may be considered to constitute compulsory 
arbitration. The other states that do provide compulsory 
arbitration as such, however, establish very definite 
procedures for it, and these are not contained in the 
Slichter Act. Assuming that inclusion of a set of procedures 
for compulsory arbitration in the Slichter Act would make 
a significant change in its 01 erall character, this writer 
does not think that the use of the act would have been 
any more successful 
In the six cases studied, settlement was reached in 
three of them in a matter of a few weeks and in a fourth 
after about two months by collective bargaining. The last 
two cases were settled by voluntary arbitration, one in 
about two and a half months and the other in slightly more 
than eight months. In all cases, settlement was finally 
obtained voluntarily, and it would be difficult to argue 
that compulsory settlement would have been better. The 
Milk Companies' dispute, which lasted fo~ over eight mohths, 
might have been settled much earlier by compulsory arbitration, 
but it would be impossible to state that the settlement would 
therefore have been better. The matter of public protection 
need not even be considered here, for compulsory arbitration 
would add nothing to the already existing seizure power. 
The second major difference between the Slichter Act 
and the acts of other states is a matter of extent of 
coverage. As it was mentioned in Chapter Four, the original 
authors of the Slichter Act specifically stated that inclusion 
of transportation in the coverage of the Slichter Act was not 
proper, for this was a matter of convenience and not of 
health and safety. If the Slichter Act were to include 
transportation and co~ication like eleven of the other 
state laws do, it would seem that the basic intent of the 
law would thus be altered. However, since an amendment to 
the Act in 1954 extended coverage to a steamship authority, 
this argument would be rather tenous. 
Vfuether or not the Slichter Act would have been better 
if it had included transportation and communication would 
be extremely difficult to decide on the basis of experience. 
What is really involved is a question of standards, and it 
is not the purpose of this writer to establish here what 
the standards for public protection should be. Pr obably 
the only conclusive thing that can be said is that since 
extension of the Act to cover the Eastern Massachusetts 
bus strikes was refused by the legislature in two different 
disputes, and since such coverage was omitted from the act 
in the rirst place, there apparently is no strong desire 
to have such coverage in the Slichter Act, Essentially, 
the legislature established the standards for public 
protection, 
Tests of Constitutionality 
The most valuable experience of other states, in so 
rar as implications for the Slichter Act are concerned, 
lies in the records of court cases involving tests or 
constitutionality of the acts. In Chapter One, the fall 
or the Kansas act berore the u. s. Supreme Court was 
described, Here, the experience of the post World War 
II acts will be outlined, and it will be shown that the 
development of court opinion places a severe question or 
constitutionality on the Slichter Act. In the opinion of 
this writer, the Slichter Act would survive a court test 
under only very special circumstances. 
The Michigan and New Jersey laws were the rirst to 
run afoul or the courts. In Michigan, the state court 
round the act to be invalid on the ground that its provision 
ror appointment or a member of the judiciary as chairman or 
the arbitration board conferred non-judicial powers upon a 
judicial orficer, This was contrary to the state consti-
tutional provisions requiring the separation or the execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches or the government. 
The court, however, did not comment on the substantive pro-
visions of the law nor its relation to the federal consti-
tution.l The Michigan legislature corrected this legal 
deficiency and the act is now valid. New Jersey has had a 
somewhat more difficult time getting its law straightened out. 
In its first court test, the law was declared valid by the 
court as it applied to a particular case. The question in 
point involved the seizure of a telephone company where the 
governor assumed nominal control and did not disposses the 
company of its property. Said the court: "If the state 
actually deprived or attempted to deprive the company of its 
property under colour of the statute, a very different legal 
y 
situation would be presented.2 Later, however, the law was 
declared unconstitutional by a state court because it did 
not provide standards with which to guide arbitrators 
in acting under its provisions, and this constituted an 
unwarranted delegation of legislative authority.) This 
weakness was corrected by the legislature and the law was 
subsequently upheld: 
The New Jersey statute regulating labor disputes 
is a valid exercise of such police power, since it 
seeks to protect the public from the clear and pre-
sent danger of interruption of essential services 
through strike and lockouts in public utilities. 
Neither the NLRA nor the LMRA preclude a state 
in the valid exercise of its police power from pro-
hibiting ~trikes for the protection of the public 
interest.'+ 
!/Compulsory Arbitration in the United States•" International 
Labor Review, LVJII (December 1948) p. 771. 
2/ !hid., P• 970e 
3/Labor Law Reporter, Volumes 4 and 4a, "State Lawstt, 
Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
4/ 16 Labor Cases 65, lb2 (1949) and 18 Labor Cases 65, 997 
1950. 
The next constitutional test came before the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin in 1950 in Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Board~· Milwaukee Gas Light Co. In its opinion, the state 
court declared that the public utility anti-strike laws of 
t.._Jaj 
Wisconsin was constitutional and ~ not in conflict with 
federal law. "In any event, Congress has no power to ques-
tion the states' control over their public utilities. That 
power belongs to the state."l The issue of the pre-emption 
of federal law, namely the National Labor Relations Act and 
the Labor Management Relations Act, became more prominant 
because of a pronouncement of the National Labor Relations 
Board in 1950:" ••• public utilities including public transit 
systems ••• have ,uch an important impact on commerce as to 
warrant our jurisdiction over all cases involving such en-
terprises, where they are engaged in commerce or in operations 
affecting commerce, subject only to the rule of ~ minimus."2 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin did not have the last 
word, as it turned out, for in February of 1951, the case 
of Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and 
Motor Coach Employees of America V. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Board the u. s. Supreme Court completely reversed 
the ruling of the Wisconsin court and threw an entirely 
different light. on the state public utility laws. In this 
case the U. s. Supreme Court ruled: 1/ The amended NLRA 
1/ 19 Labor Cases 66, 041 (1950). 
2/ 91 NLRB 630 (1950). . 
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completely pre-empts the field of ~aceful strike regulation. 
Public utilities are within the jurisdiction of the NLRA, and 
therefore, the Wisconsin Act, which prohibits peaceful strikes 
in public utilities, is unconstitutional because it conflicts 
with federal law; 2/ The national emergency strike provisions 
of the LMRA do not intend to leave local emergency strikes 
to the states, but rather to pre-empt the regulation of 
peaceful strikes; 3/ further, the Wisconsin Act attempts to 
regulate not only emergency strikes, but all public 
utility strikes, and it is therefore unconstitutional because 
it conflicts with the LMRA.l Essentially, the Wisconsin 
law was held to abrogate the right to strike as guaranteed 
in interstate commerce by the .Taft-Hartley law. The court 
also noted that invoking the law does not constitute an 
emergency and that the Wisconsin law was not emergency legis-
lation, but rather a general code for settling labor disputes. 
The court did not indicate whether or not it would consider 
genuine emergency legislation in a disaster situation to be 
within the police powers of the state.2 
Three months after the Wisconsin decision, the Indiana 
public utilities law came before a Circuit Court amd was 
declared unconstitutional on the same grounds as the 
Wisconsin case.3 During the same year, however, the Missouri 
1/ 19 Labor Cases 66, 193 (1951). 
2/ Lehrer, Seymour H., 2£• cit., P• 617. 
3/ Marshall~· Schricker, 2~abor Cases 66,372 (1951). 
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law came before the state courts and at least came out 
with a whole skin. In this case, however, only the 
mediation provisions of the act were being questioned, and 
the court declared that such provisions are in harmony with 
one another, there is no conflict with federal law. Other 
portions of the act, authorizing seizure and compulsory 
arbitration, however, were deemed separable from the portion 
of the Act under question, so no decision was rendered on the 
remainder of the act.l 
On March 10, 1952, the Florida law came up for judge-
ment in a Florida Circuit Court. In Florida ~ ~ ~ 
~· Henderson this law was declared unconstitutional again 
on the sane grounds as the Wisconsin case. Two years later 
the Florida Supreme .court upheld the decision, stating that 
a state law is unconstitutional if it deprives rights 
guaranteed by federal law. 2 During this period a case 
under the Virginia law came before the ~!strict Court3 
and the u. s. Supreme Court~ but this case was disposed 
of on the grounds other than constitutionality. The peti-
tioners, however, argued on the basis of the Wisoonsin decision. 
In Minnesota, where the law covers only charitable 
hospitals, the state supreme court decided in 1954 that 
1/20 Labor Cases, 
2/ 23 Labor Cases 
~~ 21 Labor Cases 
4/ 21 Labor Cases 
66,647 (1951). 
67, 584 (1953). 
67.497 (1952). 
67,023 (1952) .• 
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charitable hospitals are exempt from the terms of the 
NLRA. 1 Further, the court stated that the NLRA did not 
operate to nullify the right of the states to exercise 
police power and to protect the public health and safety. 
The court also determined that the substitution of com-
pulsory arbitration for the ri~ht to strike was reasonable 
and fair. In 1956 the Missouri law was again brought to 
test, this time involving the constitutionality of the gov-
ernment power of seizure.2 The Circuit Court of St. Louis 
issued an injunction against the union, which had been 
striking against a seized gas distributing plant. This 
court declined to hold the statute unconstitutional because 
the law did not "clearly" violate the constitution. 
Later, the case was taken to the Missouri Supreme 
Court and the constitutionality of the law as it applied 
to this case was upheld.3 The court declared that the state 
action was justified because the strike in question in-
volved violence and sabotage which "constituted a serious 
threat to the health, welfare and safety of the community." 
This action would come within the police powers of the state, 
declared the court, and is not pre-empted by federal law. 
The sections of the state statute used in this case did not 
include compulsory arbitration and could not be held in 
1/ Fairview HosSital Association v. Hospital Employees Union, 
25 Labor Cases 8,285 (1954). 
2/Missouri v. O.Y. Chemical and Atomic Workers Local 8-6, 
31 Labor Cases 76,237 (1956). 
3/ 35 Labor Cases 71,847 (1958). 
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conflict with the L~rnA on that ground. This strike was 
quite different from those that have been experienced in 
Massachusetts under the Slichter Act. The threat to the 
public health and safety did not come about because the 
workers walked off their jobs in the gas distributing. 
plant; supervisors, apparently, were quite capable of main-
taining a supply of gas. However, unauthorized people, 
presumably union, closed valves which shut off service to 
various sectors supplied by the company. Also, water was 
injected into the mains which would seek a low spot in the 
system and block off the flow of gas. Gas leaks caused 
by this "on-again, off-again" service were reported from 
all over the company system and this, indeed, constituted 
a public hazard which if allowed to continue could reach 
disaster proportions. 
From these judicial decisions, particularly those in 
the Wisconsin case, two generalizations can be made. 
The first is that any peaceful public utility strike which 
involves no grave emergency is clearly under federal juris-
diction, and the right to strike cannot be restricted by 
state law. The second is that a good case might be made for 
state control of real emergency strikes, as decided by the 
Missouri Supreme Court, under the police powers of the state. 
As yet, however, this test has not come before the u. S. 
Supreme Cpurt. 
Implications of court Tests 
The court experience of laws in other states makes 
it immediately apparent that using the Slichter Act for 
the settlement of disputes in utilities where a serious 
public hazard is not involved comes within the scope of 
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the Wisconsin decision. There is no question to this writer 
that in a test of constitutionality the use of the Act in 
such a case would not be upheld. Although a temporary strike 
stay and the use of a Moderator might be considered as 
consistant with the LMRA, state seizure of an industry 
would almost certainly be considered to be in conflict 
with federal law. 
The effect of having the Slichter Act knocked down 
in court might be damaging, as pointed out by one of the 
State House agencies, because such a Supreme Court decision 
would undermine the confidence of labor and management in 
the regular conciliation and arbitration services offered 
by the state outside of the Slichter Act. This would be 
contrary to the point of using the Act in the first p~ce. 
The constitutional status of the Slichter Act has been re-
ported to the Governor,.and it would be difficult to believe 
that he could use the Act with any confidence with each 
invocation being tantamount to igniting a judicial fuse. 
1~ 
Conclusions 
A comparison with other state laws shows that the 
Slichter Act is generally less comprehensive, by omitting 
compulsory arbitration, and is more limited in its coverage, 
excluding transportation and communication. These dif-
ferences, however, did not reflect unfavorably on the 
Slichter Act. Constitutional tests of other state laws 
did show that the Slichter Act is on pather hazardous 
legal ground, and that the only reasonably safe area of use 
lay in application to disputes in which there was a real 
threat to the public health and safety. 
CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
Consideration of the important aspects of the 
Slichter Act and its use has been given in the five 
chapters of this paper. Conclusions reached in these 
chapters are as follows: 
10) 
1. The period in which the Slichter Act was established 
was unique in labor annals. The unprecedented restless 
of the period aroused a desire for protective legislation 
and resulted in the passage of the Slichter Act as well 
as similar legislation in a group of other states. 
2. A study of the six applications of the Slichter 
Act showed that its use was not required by the circumstances 
and that it was actually used for purposes other than 
those for which it was intended. The anticipated need for the 
Act really did not materialize. 
3. An examination of the periods in which the Act 
was not used did not reveal any cases in which protection 
of the public health and safety was required. Requests 
for exAension of the Act to cover the bus strikes did not 
receive the support of the legislature and were considered 
improper. 
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4. If a serious emergency had arisen during the 
past twelve year~, it was shown that alternative legislation 
exists which could have provided authority for the 
Governor to take preventative action, making the existance 
of the Slichter Act.unnecessary. 
5. Tpe Slichter Act was examined as a settlement 
mechanism and no indication was found that it added 
significantly to the ultimate settlement of the six cases 
in which it was used. There is some reason to believe that 
in these disputes and in others where the Act was not used, 
the Slichter Act may actually have detracted from the 
settlement. 
6. Inspection of the public protection laws of other 
states showed that they had no provisions which would make 
a clear improvement in the Slichter Act. Also, the court 
experience of some of these laws indicated that an im-
portant question of constitutionality was involved in 
the Slichter Act. 
Conclusions 
This writer concludes that expe"ience has not justified the 
original anticipated need for the Slichter Act and that 
present conditions do not warrant existence of the law. 
No test of its primary purpose of protecting the puolic 
health and safety was experienced; but its actual uses, which 
were~alled for by the circumstances, showed that it was 
not noticeably affective in aiding the settlement of 
"-' disputes, and was,, possible~ hinderance. As a law it is 
l05 
redundant and now of questionable constitutionality. For 
these reasons, the conclusion is reached that the 
Massachusetts Slichter Act has not been a successful law. 
APPJ:IIDIX 
APPENDIX I 1 
GENERAL LAWS, TER. ED., CHAPTER 150B 
(INCLUDING CHAP. 551 OF 1954) 
AN ACT RELA.TIVE TO THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF IN• 
DUS TRIAL DIS PUlES • 
SECTION 1. The general court hereby finds that the 
distribution of food, fuel, water, electric light and 
power, gas, and hospital and medical services is ••· 
sential to the public health and safety and that the 
settlement of industrial disputes which threatens sub• 
stantial interruption of such distribution is therefore 
affected with a public interest; that the adjustment of 
u 
differences concerning wages, hours and other terms and 
condi tiona of employment which might lead to such disputes 
can best be accomplished by encouraging collective bar-
gaining between employers and representatives freely 
designated or selected by their employees; but that the 
intervention of government is necessary to protect the 
public health and safety whenever an industrial dispute 
which has not been settled by collective bargaining 
threatens an immediate and substantial interruption in the 
production or distribution of food, fuel, water, electric 
light or power, gas, or hospital or medical services which 
would dangerously curtail their availability in any community. 
I/ Is reprinted in Labor Law Bulletin No. 6, The Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries PP• 6-u. 
It is therefore declared to be the policy of the 
commonwealth (a) to place primary responsibility upon the 
employers and representatives freely designated or selected 
by employees for the avoidance of any interruption in the 
production or distribution of food, fuel, water, electric 
light and power, gas, or hospital or medical services re-
sulting from differences concerning wages, hours and other 
terms and conditions of employment and (b) in the event 
that a peaceful adjustment of such differences is not ac-
complished by collective bargaining, to provide procedures 
for government intervention and the establishment of wages, 
hours and other terms and condi tiona of employment without 
any interruption in the production or distribution of such 
goods or services which would dangerously curtail their 
availability in any community. 
SECTION 2. When used in this chapter--
"Person" includes one or more individuals, partnerships, 
associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, 
in bankruptcy, or receivers. 
"Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of 
an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include 
the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof, or 
any labor organization (other than when acting as an em-
ployer), or any one acting in the capacity of officer or 
agent of such labor organi•ation. 
"Representative of employees" means any person or 
labor organization designated or selected for the purpose 
of collective bargaining by a majority of the employees 
in a unit appropriate for such purposes. 
"Labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning 
rates of pay, wages, hours or terms, tenure or conditions 
of employment, or concerning the association or represen-
tation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, 
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of 
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in 
the proximate relation of employer and employee. 
iT 
"Essential goods or services" means food, fuel, water, 
electric light or power, gas and hospital or medical services. 
"Production" includes production, manufacture, mining, 
handling, transporting, or in any other manner working on, 
and shall also include any process or occupation necessar,r 
to such production. 
"Distribution" includes distributing, transporting, 
handling, storing, selling at wholesale or retail, or 
furnishing and shall also include any process or occupa-
tion necessar,r to such distribution. 
SECTION 3. In the event that the commissioner of labor 
and industries finds that a labor dispute has not been 
settled by collective bargaining and imminently threatens 
a substantial interruption in t~ production or distribu-
tion of essential goods or services, he shall certify such 
dispute to the governor. 
The governor shall thereupon conduct such investigation 
of the dispute as he deems appropriate under the circum-
stances but the investigation shall include• unless the 
governor deems it impracticable• an informal hearing 
before the governor. the commissioner of public safety 
and the commissioner of labor and industries at which the 
parties to the dispute shall be heard upon the sole question 
whether an interruption is imminent and would curtail ths 
availability of essential goods or services to such an extent 
as to endanger the health or safety of any community. If the 
governor so finds and proclaims. and further finds and pro-
claims that the intervention of government will be in the 
public interest and in accordance with the policy of this 
chapter. then he is authorized to invoke either or both of 
the following procedures for the settlement of the dispute:--
(A) The governor may require the employer and repre-
sentatives of the employees, parties to the dispute, to appear 
before a moderator appointed by him and show cause why they 
should not submit the dispute to arbitration. The moderator 
shall be an impartial person skilled in industrial relations. 
The moderator may act as mediator or conciliator to such an 
extent as he deems appropriate and, if the dispute is not 
settled, shall endeavor to induce the parties to submit the 
dispute to arbitration in such form as may be mutually 
acceptable, and to this end he may conduct such investi-
gation and public or private bearing as he deems appropriate. 
If either or both of the parties refuses to comply with 
the request of the moderator to submit the dispute to 
arbitration, the moderator, without expressing an opinion 
on the merits of the dispute, shall make public his findings 
as to the responsibility of either or both parties tor the 
failure to reach an agreement to arbitrate the dispute. 
A submission to arbitration shall be arranged or the 
findings or the moderator published within fifteen days 
after the govornor's proclamation or such additional per-
iod as may be mutually agreeable to the parties. For fifteen 
days after the governor's proclamation and any additional 
period mutually agreeable to the parties, no changge shall 
be made, except by mutual agreement, in the rates of pay, 
wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment in 
effect prior to the time the events giving rise to the dis• 
pute took place, and there shall be no interruption in the 
production or distribution of the essential goods or servines 
produces or distributed by the parties to the dispute. 
(B) The governor may request the parties to submit the 
dispute to an emergency board or inquiry of three members 
empowered to recommend the terms upon which the parties 
should settle the disputute, including the date, prospective 
or retroactive as of which its recommendations should be 
made effective. To this end the governor may request the 
employer forthwith to designate a member to represent in-
dustry and the representatives of the employees to designate 
a member to represent labor, neither of whom shall be a 
person who has theretofore participated in the dispute. The 
indus try and labor members shall selB c t a third impartial 
member to represent the general public. If such third peraon 
is not selected within seventy-two hours, the governor may 
appoint the third member either before or after arranging a 
submission of the dispute. In the former event the emer-
gency board s.ball meet with the parties and report to the 
governor within five days whether the parties have agreed 
to comply with his request to submit the dispute for its 
findings and recommendations. If there is no agreement the 
emergency board shall be discharged. 
If a submission is arranged the emergency board shall 
conduct its hearing and make and file its findings and re-
commendations with the governor within a period of thirty 
days after the submission of auch dispute unless the parties 
shall mutually agree to extend the period. Prior to the 
tiling of the findings and recommendations and for ten days 
thereafter, no change shall be made, except by mutual agree-
ment of the parties, in the rates of pay, wages, hours, or 
other terms or conditions of employment in effect prior 
to the time the events giving rise to the dispute took 
place, and there shall be no interruption in the production 
or distribution of the essential goods or distributed by the 
parties to the dispute. Within ten days after the report of 
the emergency board is filed each party shall notify the 
governor whether it accepts the recommendations. 
SECTION 4• (a) Whenever the governor finds that as a 
result of a labor dispute an interruption of production or 
distribution has occurred or is imminently threatened which 
would curtail the availability of essential goods or ser-
vices to such an extent as to endanger the health or safety 
of any community and that such dispute either (a) has not 
been settled under the procedures established by section 
three or (b) is of such a nature that those procedures 
cannot be applied thereto, he shall thereupon declare that 
an emergency exists in respect to such essential goods or 
services. During such emergency the governor may--
(A) Enter into arrangements with either or both of the 
parties to the dispute for continuing the production of such 
part of the goods or services theretofore produced or dis-
tributed by them as may be necessary to safeguard the public 
health and safety. The governor with the approval of the 
council may make and promulgate rules and regulations, to be 
effective immediately, for carrying out such arrangements and 
preventing inte~ference therewith. 
(B) (1) Take possession of, and operate in whole o~ 
in pa~t, a~ plant o~ facility of a pa~ty to the dispute 
the full o~ pa~tial ope~ation of which by the commonwealth 
he deems to be necessary as a result of such dispute, in 
o~de~ to safegua~d the public health o~ safety. Such powe~ 
and autho~ity may be exe~cised th~ugh any depa~tment o~ 
agency of the commonwealth and with the assistance of such 
public o~ p~ivate inst~umentalities o~ pe~sons as may be 
designated by the gove~no~. Such plant o~ facility shall 
be o~~ated fo~ the account of the pe~son operating it 
immediately p~io~ to the seizure; p~vided, that such pe~son 
shall have the ~ight to elect, by w~itten notice filed with 
the gove~no~ within ten days afte~ such seizure, to waive 
all claims to the p~oceeds of such operation, and to receive 
in lieu the~eof fa!~ and ~easonable compensation fo~ the 
app~op~iation md temporary use of his p~ope~ty, fo~ which 
he may b~ing a petition fo~ damages against the commonwealth 
unde~ chapte~ two hundred and fifty-eight. In determining 
the amount of compensation to be awa~ded in such p~oceed• 
ings, there shall be taken into account the existence of 
the labo~ dispute which inte~~pted o~ threatened imminently 
to inte~~pt the p~ivate operation of such plant o~ facility, 
and the effect of such inte~~ption o~ threatened inte~~p­
tion upon the value to the petitione~ of the use o f such plant 
o~ facility. 
(2) The declaration or emergency or the seizure and 
operation of a plant or facility by the commonwealth shall 
not render inapplicable any state or federal law concerning 
the health, safety, security and employment standards, and 
the department or agency operating such plant or facility 
shall comply with said laws as if it were privately operated. 
During such emergency the rates of pay, wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment theretofore eff-
ective shall be maintained without change; provided, that 
if an emergency board of inquiry shall have been appointed 
and shall, after a bearing, have recommended changes. in 
rates of pay, wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of 
employment, such changes may, in the discretion or the gov-
ernor, be made effective in any plant which is being oper-
ated by the commonwealth; and provided, further, that when 
no emergency board of inquiry has been appointed, the gov-
ernor may appoint a special commission which shall, except 
as provided by paragraph (3), after a hearing, make recom-
mendations concerning the rates of pay, wages, hours, and 
terms and conditions of employment for the period of public 
operation, which recommendations may, in the discretion of 
the governor, be made effective in such plant or facility 
during said period. The special commission shall base its 
recommendations on such of the factors normally taken into 
account in collective bargaining or voluntary arbitration 
as it deems material, including the conditions in existence 
in the industry affected. The special commission shall be 
composed of not less than three nor more than six members 
designated either to represent the general public or with 
equal numbers to represent industry, labor and the public, 
but in the latter event the governor before appointing the 
members of such commission shall request the employer to re-
commend the members to represent industry Ill d the represen-
tatives of the employees to recommend the members to represent 
labor. If the commission recommends a change, it shall in-
clude in its recommendations a date, pros}11 ctive or retro-
active, but not prior to the date of such public operation 
as of which its recommendations Shall be made effective and 
in doing so shall consider evidence as to the responsibility 
of either party for delaying a settlement or rejecting ar-
bitration. 
(3) In the case of a labor dispute between or amoung 
parties to a valid and existing collective bargaining ag-
reement, the authority of any special commission appointed 
under this section shall be limited, with respect to the 
unexpired period of such agreement, to the determination 
of grievances asserted thereunder, and the making of recom• 
mendations or determinations concerning the proper inter-
pretation and application of the provisions of such agreement; 
provided, that if the said existing collective bargaining 
agreement shall contain provisions for arbitration of 
grievances or interpretations of such agreement, a special 
commission appointed by the governor hereunder shall take 
no action inconsistent with such agreement. Recommenda• 
tions which may be made by such a commission in excess of 
its authority as herein limited shall not be made effective 
during the period of public operation. 
(b) Dllring such emergency it shall be unlawful for 
any person to engage in any concerted activities inter-
fering or threatening to interfere with the operation of 
any plant or facility which is being operated by the common• 
wealth for the purpose of bringing about any change in rates 
of p&71 wages, hours, or terms or conditions of employment; 
or to aid or encourage any such concerted cessation of work 
or other concerted activities by giving direction or guid-
ance in the conduct thereof or by providing funds for the 
payment of strike, unemployment or other benefits to JE! rsons 
participating therein; or to violate any rule or regulation 
promulgated by the governor with the approval of the council 
under paragraph (A). Nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued as requiring any individual employee to render labor 
or service without his consent. In the case of partial op-
eration this subsection (b) shall apply only to that portion 
of the operation of a plant or facility carried on by 
the commonwealth. 
(c) Whenever the parties to a labor dispute which has 
led the governor to proclaim the existence of an emergency 
under this section shall jointly report in writing to the 
governor that they have executed an agreement terminating 
or adjusting the said dispute, and that they are in a pos-
ition to resume or continue without interruption the oper-
ation of any plant or facility for the production or dis-
tribution of essential goods or services the governor shall 
terminate forthwith with respect to such plant or facility 
any arrangements made pursuant to paragraph (A) and, if 
such plant or facility is being operated by the commonwealth, 
it shall be restored immediately to the person entitled 
thereto. The supreme judicial court or the superior court 
shall have jurisdiction in equity, on petition of any ag-
grieved party, to enforce compliance with the provisions of 
this subsection. 
(d) Whenever, in the opinion of the governor, the inter-
vention of the commonwealth under this section is no longer 
necessary to safeguard the public health or safety, he shall 
declare the termination of the emergency without regard to 
the settlement or continuation of the labor dispute. 
SECTION 5. (a) No person, other than the common-
wealth as provided in subsection (b) hereof and except as 
provided in subsection (c) of section four, shall be en-
titled to ~gal or equitable relief in any court of the 
commonwealth as a result of a violation of any provision 
of this chapter. 
(b) The superior court in a suit by the commonwealth 
shall have jurisdiction to restrain and enjoin violations 
of this chapter and such jurisdiction shall not be limited 
by the provisions concerning labor disputes contained in 
section twenty C of chapter one hundred and forty-nine, 
sections one, nine and nine A of chapter two hundred and 
fourteen, and sections thirteen A and thirteen B of chapter 
two hundred and twenty; provided, that such suits shall be 
brought by direction of the governor and not otherwise. 
SECTION 6. If any provision of this chapter or the 
application of such provision to any perron or circum-
stances shall be held invalid, the remainder of this 
chapter, or the application of such provisions to persons 
or circumstances other than those as to which it is held 
invalid, shall not be affected thereby. 
SECTION 7. None of the. provisions of this chapter 
shall be applicable to any dispute involving employees who 
are subject to and protected by the Federal Railway 
Labor Act. 
SECTION 8. Any person appointed by the governor to 
serve as a moderator or as a member of a special commission 
or as an impartial member of an emergency board or any 
person selected as an impartial member of an emergency board 
under the provisions of this act, shall receive a per diem 
fee of fifty dollars plus reasonabe and necessary expenses. 
The commissioner or labor and industries is authorized and 
directed to arrange for any facilities required by such 
boards or moderators including the place for the hearing 
and stenographic trrn scripts of the hearing and the common-
wealth shall pay for the same upon the certification or the 
commissioner. 
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ABSTRACT 
ABSTRACT 
The objective or this paper, ~ ~ppraisal ~ ~ 
Slichter Act, is to examine the Slighter Act of Mass-
achusetts in order to determine whether or not 
xrlx 
it has successfully accomplished its purposes, and 
whether or not it is adapted to present day conditions. 
The evidence shows that neither or these criterion can 
be answered in the affirmative. Although the primary 
purpose of the Act, that of providing protection rrom 
industrial disputes dangerous to the public health and 
sarety, has hot been given a bona fide~test, the 
secondary purpose of the Act of aiding the settlement 
or these disputes has not been realized on the basis 
of the existing experience. 
During the period of time which produced the 
Slichter Act, levels of strike activity were at an all 
time high, and a need was felt for some control of 
strikes. As a result, the Slichter Act, as well as 
similar laws in other states, was passed by the legis-
lature. The Slichter Act provided several alternatives 
to handle disputes which might threaten the public health 
and safety by an interruption in the supply of essential 
goods and services, primarily food, electricity, gas, 
water, heat, and hospital services. The Governor was 
empowered to appoint a Moderator, whose function would 
XXX 
be to induce the parties to arbitrate or otherwise 
reach settlement. If the Moderator was unsuccessful,, 
the Governor was given the authority to seize the company 
involved, to appoint an emergency arbitration board, and 
finally to appoint a special commission for making recom-
mendations. Although the recommendations of either the 
emergency arbitration board or the special commission were 
not necessarily binding, the Governor was given the power 
to effect such recommendations during seizure. 
Since the Slichter Act was passed, it has been used 
six times; four concerned public utilities, one a trucker's 
association, and one a group of milk companies. In 
three of the utility disputes, a strike in all probability 
would not have resulted in a serious reduction in service, 
if any at all; and in the fourth utility dispute, an imin-
ent strike threat was not actually present. In both the 
Trucker's Association and Milk Companies disputes, the 
circumstances indicated that the reduct!. on of supply that 
was or would be caused by a strike, could not reasonably 
be considered as a threat to the public health and safety. 
The conclusion, therefore, that use of the Slichter Act 
was unnecessary in these six cases id unavoidable. 
A study of cases in which the Slichter Act might have 
been used, but was not, shows thatpublic protection was 
not required outside of the six cases previously studied. 
Certain cases not covered by the Slichter Act, princi-
pally the Eastern Massachusetts bus strikes, requested 
extension ~f the coverage of the Act, but were turned 
down by the legislature. It is concluded that a need 
for additional use of the Act was not experienced, and 
that if a real disaster strike has arisen, the Sltchter 
Act would not have been necessary because sufficient pro-
tection was afforded by alternative statutes. 
The use of the Slichter Act as a settlement mechan-
ism has not proved to be noticeably helpful. In the six 
disputes in which the Act was used, settlement was reach-
ed in four of them by collective bargaining, and in two 
by voluntary arbitration. The parties to these disputes 
expressly avaided the settlement mechanisms of the Act, 
and none of the settlements resulted directly from the 
use of the Act. In two of the disputes, the Trucker's 
Association and the Milk Companies, there was fair in-
dication t~the Slichter Act actually hindered settle-
ment. Other cases show that the influence of the Act, 
even though it was not used, creates a tendency for ir-
relevant issues to be introduced in collective bargain-
ing strategy and for the encouragenent of strike threats. 
In several cases, the Act was merely being used as a 
xxxii 
protective shield by either labor or management, which 
diminished their responsibility in a strike action. 
In the experience of other states with laws similar 
to the Slichter Act, it is found that the major differ-
ences between the Massachusetts law and those of ~ther 
states were the provision for detailed compulsory arbi-
tration procedures, and the extension of coverage to 
communication and transportation. The addition of 
compulsory arbitra~ion procedures to the Slichter Act 
would not improve its effectiveness either as a pro-
tective code or as an aid to settling disputes. The 
addition of communication and transportation to the 
coverage of the Act cannot be evaluated without estab-
lishing some standards for public protection. Setting 
such standards is not proper for this paper, but since 
the legislature has refused to extend the coverage of 
the 4qt on several occasions, it is concluded that a 
strong need ofr extended coverage does not exist. 
The u. s. Supreme Court ruling that the Wiaconsin 
act was unconstitutional proved to be an important 
precedent and established federal pre-amption in al-
most all disputes in which the state laws might be used. 
One area of use was left undecided, and that was temp-
orary action by the state under its police power to 
xxxiii 
prevent stiikes that might actually endanger life or 
propert~. This type of strike, however, has not been 
experienced under the Slichter Act. 
The conclusion of this paper is that experience has 
not justified the original anticipated need for the 
Slichter Act and that present conditions do not warrant 
existance of the law, No test of its primary purpose of 
protecting the public health and safety was experienced; 
but its actual uses, which were not called for by the 
circumstances, showed that it was not noticeably effec-
tive in aiding settlement of disputes, and was possibly 
a hinderance. As a law it is redundant and now of 
questionable constitutionality. For these reasons, the 
conclusion is reached that the Massachusetts Slichter 
Act has not been a successful law. 
